Recent Decisions by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 14 Issue 2 Article 7 
1945 
Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Decisions, 14 Fordham L. Rev. 219 (1945). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol14/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
ADVERSE POSSESSION-ENTRY BY MISTAKE-INTENT TO CLAIM ADVERSELY-EVI-
DENTIARY EFEECT or OFFER BY CLAIMANT TO PURchAsE.-Plaintiff brought suit to
prove his title to a certain strip of land. Plaintiff and defendant were owners of
two adjoining lots of land. The defendant testified that when he purchased his
lot in 1923 it was fenced, and that he bought and went into possession with reference
to this fence as a boundary line. In 1943 the fence was blown down by a storm and
in a survey made prior to the erection of a new fence, the plaintiff discovered that
the defendant's true boundary line was 20 inches inside the fence line, and that he
had been encroaching upon the plaintiff's property for 20 years. It seems to have
been conceded that this was the first time either party had actual knowledge of the
encroachment. Defendant thereupon offered to purchase the disputed strip of land
but the plaintiff rejected this offer. The case was submitted to the jury on the
single issue whether the defendant had been in adverse possession for the required
statutory period. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Held:
Judgment affirmed. The defendant's offer of purchase was admissible as evidence
showing the possession had not been adverse. Peters v. Gillund, - Tex. -, 186
S. W. (2d) 1019 (1945).
A first reading of the opinion might lead one to believe that the court based
its decision upon the defendant's lack of knowledge that he was encroaching on the
plaintiff's land. It was an admitted fact that the plaintiff never thought he owned
the strip of land in controversy and that the. defendant did believe that he, the
defendant, owned it. This raised a pure issue of law: whether title by adverse
possession can be acquired where the one in possession lacks the knowledge that he
is in possession of another's land. Upon this issue of law there is some conflict.
Some of the decisions recognize that the adverse claimant must be aware of the claim
of the true owner in order to bring his own claim under the rule of adverse pos-
session.' However the later cases allow the adverse claimant to take title even though
his original entry was by mistake. The weight of authority is definitely in accord
with the latter view,2 and this is the New York rule,3 and the Texas rule as well.4
1. In the following decisions the courts took the view that adverse possession could
not be acquired by mistake: Litchfield v. Sewell, 97 Iowa 247, 66 N. W. 104 (1896);
Skinner v. Crawford, 54 Iowa 119, 6 N. W. 144 (1880); Grube v. Wells, 34 Iowa 148
(1871); Preble v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 85 Me. 260, 27 AtI. 149 (1893); Toby v. Secor, 60
Wis. 310, 19 N. W. 99 (1884).
2. Barrett v. Kelly, 131 Ala. 378, 30 So. 824 (1901); Wagner v. Meinzer, 38 Cal. App.
670, 177 Pac. 293 (1919); Searles v. De Ladson, 81 Conn. 133, 70 At. 589 (1908);
Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 Pac. 1066 (1909); Ovig v. Morrison, 142 Wis.
243, 125 N. W. 449 (1910).
3. Effert v. Greim, - Misc. -, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 935 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Roulston v.
Stewart, 40 App. Div. 200, 57 N. Y. Supp. 1061 (2d Dep't 1899); Race v. Stewart, 5 App.
Div. 598, 39 N. Y. Supp. 438 (3d Dep't 1896); Crary v. Goodman, 22 N. Y. 170 (1860).
4. Gleckler v. Denton, Tex. Civ. App., 149 S. W. (2d) 213, 214 (1941); Major v.
Meyers, Tex. Civ. App., 111 S. W. (2d) 1184 (1937), (1938) 16 TEx. L. REv. 562; Bowles
v. Watson, Tex. Civ. App., 245 S. W. 120 (1922); Hand v. Swann, 1 Tex. Civ. App., 241,
21 S. W. 282 (1892); Harne v. Smith, 79 Tex. 310, 15 S. .W. 240 (1891); Bruce v.
Washington, 80 Tex. 368, 15 S. W. 1104 (1891); Bisso v. Casper, 14 Tex. Civ. App., 19,
36 S. W. 345 (1896).
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An analysis of this problem will make it apparent that the majority view is by
far the better one. In Belotti v. Bickhar&d5 the court lists the five essential ele-
ments of adverse possession,6 and the only one about which there is any doubt
in the instant case is the first, that the possession must be hostile and under claim
of right. There has never been a hard and fast definition of such hostility, although
the courts require hostility in every adverse possession case. It is clear from the
various decisions that hostility does not involve ill-will. 7 It more clearly involves
the claim of an exclusive right and a denial of the true owner's claim.8 However,
this hostility need not be express, as it may be evidenced by the acts of the adverse
claimant in asserting dominion over the property in controversy. 9 The precise point
of the conflict mentioned above is whether the courts must look beyond the hos-
tility of the adverse claimant as evidenced objectively by his acts and consider
whether subjectively the claimant was conscious that his possession was adverse to
the true owner. Reduced to its simplest form the conflict presents one issue. Must
the claim be consciously hostile? Is it enough for the adverse claimant to think:
"I claim this land as my own", or must he have the following mental attitude:
"I know that this land belongs to M, but I will claim it as my own."? The minority' 0
appears to require the latter state of mind and it is difficult to justify that position.
Merely because one does not recognize or know that ownership is in another, that
should not prevent him from claiming title by adverse possession. The majority
view" is the sounder and more logical one because all that is required is that one
claim title to the land without regard to the existence of rights in another, and it
would seem that when one claims title unqualifiedly he is in fact asserting a
stronger claim than one who claims with knowledge that he is a trespasser.' 2
Since the defendant in the instant case occupied the land in the mistaken belief
that it was his, this mistake actually strengthened his position that the occupancy
was hostile.'3 It was a hostile occupancy because by his acts of ownership and
5. 228 N. Y. 296, 127 N. E. 239 (1920).
6. Id. at 301, the possession must be (1) hostile and under claim of right; (2) actual;
(3) open and notorious; (4) exclusive; (5) continuous.
7. Hoffine v. Ewing, 60 Neb. 729, 84 N. W. 93 (1900) ; Ballard v. Hansen, 33 Neb. 861,
51 N. W. 295, 297 (1892).
8. Worcester v. Lord, 56 Me. 265 (1868); see Doherty v. Matsell, 119 N. Y. 646, 23
N. E. 994 (1890), wherein the court held that an entry in subordination to the true owner
could not be hostile. In Bates v. Southern Ry. Co., 222 Ala. 445, 133 So. 39 (1931), the
court held that the evidence showed a permissive and subservient use that could never
develop into adverse possession.
9. Searles v. De Ladson, 81 Conn. 133, 70 Atl. 589 (1908) where the defendant disseisor
did not know that his house encroached upon another's property the court held that his
very act of possession was an assertion of title, and equivalent to a denial of title in all
others.
10. See note 1 supra.
11. See note 2 supra.
12. Hand v. Swann, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 241, 21 S. W. 282, 283 (1892); one authority
in a scholarly discussion of this topic stated this view as follows: "Possession may be
adverse without any consciously hostile intent and the intention to acquire title is prob-
ably the predominant intent in most cases of adverse possession." Bordwel, Disseisin and
Adverse Possession (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 141, 155.
13. Woodward v. Fars, 109 Cal. 12, 41 Pac. 781 (1895) (by implication).
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dominion he really denied title in any person other than himself and he never even
admitted the possibility that title might rightfully -be in another.14 Inasmuch as
he claimed the land because he thought it was his own it would seem quite apparent
that his actions were in accordance with the strict letter of the statute. 15 This inter-
pretation has been advanced by Tiffany in his work on Real Property.'6 In the
instant case the fence had been in the same place for twenty years. A landowner
is presumed to know the boundaries of his own property. According to the holdings
in some cases, since the plaintiff had never complained, it would be assumed that
he acquiesced in the defendant's occupation 17 and recognized the defendant's claim
to the strip in question, and the fact that the plaintiff acted in this way because
of ignorance of his true boundaries should not affect the defendant's plea of the
statute of limitations.' 8 Considering the origin of the prescriptive right acquired by
adverse possession, it seems clear that the possession need not be consciously hostile.
This right acquired by prescription does not have its origin in the common law,
but is purely the result of statutes of limitation. Such statutes are statutes of
repose.19 Actually they rest upon no presumption of a lost grant, nor upon any
presumption at all. The intention is not to punish one who neglects to assert
14. In Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Dodson, Tex. Civ. App., 155 S. W. (2d) 379,
381 (1941), a claimant held land under the erroneous conclusion that it had passed to
her in a partition judgment and the court held that her possession did not lack hostility and
an intent to claim full title. Cf. Dietzman v. Sayles, Tex. Civ. App., 245 S. W. 773 (1922);
Peters v. Gracia, 110 Cal. 89, 42 Pac. 455 (1895); Gross v. Blecker, Tex. Civ. App., 105
S. W. (2d) 282 (1937); Couch v. Adams, 111 Ark. 604, 164 S. W. 728 (1914).
15. TEx. ANN. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 5510 provides in substance that peaceable and
adverse possession for more than ten years will give the disseisor title to the property
so possessed.
16. TnrANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1159. The learned author takes the
position that the introduction of mistake as a factor to be considered is both unnecessary
and undesirable.
17. In McCabe v. Moore, Tex. Civ. App., 38 S. W. (2d) 641, 643 (1931) the court
pointed out that permitting a fence to remain on the agreed location for more than
twenty-five years gave rise to a strong presumption that the party disseised agreed that
the line upon which the fence was constructed was the true one.
18. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Amazon Petrol. Corp., Tex. Civ. App., 152 S. W. (2d) 902, 908
(1841) in which the court said: "Where recognition and acquiescence have continued for
the period of time prescribed by statutes concerning acquiescence or for the period re-
quired by statutes of limitation for acquisition of title by adverse possession, the pre-
sumption that the line is in fact the true line . . . becomes conclusive, and the line as
acquiesced in is conclusively established as the boundary." Of course, what is stated as
a presumption is actually a rule of substantive law. See THAYER, A PRELnnxARY TREATIsE
ON EvIDE cE AT THE CotmoN LAW (1898) pp. 316, 539, and 9 WI0GmoRE, EVIDENCE (3d
ed. 1940) § 2492.
19. 1 WooD, LimrrATIONS (4th ed. 1916) at p. 55. Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U. S. 469,
477 (1831). In Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126 (1938), the court said
at p. 136: "The statute of limitations is a statute of repose, designed to protect the citi-
zens from stale and vexatious claims, and to make an end to the possibility of litigation
after the lapse of a reasonable time. It has long been regarded by this Court and by
the courts of New York as a meritorious defense, in itself serving a public interest."
20. In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith, 125 Ky. 336, 101 S. W. 317 (1907) at p. 317
the court said: "The modern statute does not rest upon that or any other fiction [that
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his rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of land for the
time specified by the statute. While the policy behind such statutes requires that
the adverse claimant assert an absolute (though possibly unjustified) right to the
land he possesses, it would not seem to require that he know of the other's title.
Texas courts are in accord with the majority view of this problem. It is true
that the ea'lier cases went along with the minority view,2 ' and demanded that
there be a conscious intention to claim property known to be claimed by another.
However, the later decisions adopt the majority view,22 and where the majority
view is not followed, distinguishing factors are found such as the assertion of a
boundary that is to be temporary and in subordination to the true owner.23
It may be assumed that in deciding the instant case the trial and appellate courts
intended to follow the majority view. Why then was the offer to purchase the strip
in controversy admitted in evidence? It was conceded that neither party knew
of the encroachment until after the statutory period had elapsed, and since under
the majority view hostility need not be conscious, the defendant's title had become
perfected at the end of the statutory period, and it could not be divested by mere
oral declarations. Clearly, if the court adopted the majority view, it committed
error in receiving evidence of the offer to purchase. It was immaterial and irrelevant
because title having resulted from the disseisin for the required statutory period,
any subsequent disclaimer of title could not affect the defendant's title.24 There was
only a pure question of law involved in the case in view of the conceded facts,
and there was, therefore, no issue for the jury. It is true that in a proper case an
offer to purchase may be admissible. However, the important consideration is the
time at which the offer is made. If made before the statutory period has elapsed,
the offer may evidence a recognition of the right of the true owner, which will
show that the possession lacked hostility,25 or it may constitute only a means of
of a lost grant]. . . .It rests upon the wise public policy that favors peace, settlement
of disputes outside of court, and repose of conditions which the parties suffered to remain
without question so long as to indicate an acquiescence in them by all concerned."
21. Blassingame v. Davis, 68 Tex. 595, 5 S. W. 402 (1887); Sartain v. Hamilton, 12
Tex. 219 (1854).
22. See note 4 supra.
23. See Adams v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co., Tex. Civ. App., 181 S. W. (2d) 852
(1944); Brownlee v. Landers, Tex. Civ. App., 166 S. W. (2d) 734 (1942). Gross v.
Blecker, Tex. Civ. App., 105 S. W. (2d) 282 (1937); Dietzman v. Sayles, Tex. Civ. App.,
245 S. W. 773 (1922); Holland v. Nance, 102 Tex. 177, 114 S. W. 346 (1908); Weiss
v. Goodhue, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 142, 102 S. W. 793 (1907); Bender v. Brooks, 103 Tex.
329, 127 S. W. 168 (1910).
24. St. Williams Church, Raquette Lake v. People, - App. Div. -, 56 N. Y. S.
(2d) 868 (3d Dep't 1945). The court cited as authority Shirey v. Whitlow, 80 Ark. 444,
97 S. W. 444, 445 (1906), and said: "It seems that the recognition of title in another
after the full statutory period has run in favor of claimant will not reinvest the title
previously acquired by adverse possession."
25. 6 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1778 says: "Accordingly it has never been
doubted that all declarations by the occupant, importing a claim of title in himself, are
admissible as verbal parts of his act of occupation, serving to give it an adverse color;
while his declarations of disclaim, conceding another's title, are equally receivable as
giving it the contrary color. They are merely verbal parts going to make up the whole
act of occupation." In Hatton v. Burgess, Tex. Civ. App., 167 S. W. (2d) 260 (1942)
the court said that if the offer is unconditional it amounts to an acknowledgment of
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avoiding litigation and an instrument by which the adverse claimant is attempting
to buy his peace.26 If it is the latter then the running of the statute will not be
interrupted. Therefore, the offer, when made before the statutory period has
elapsed, presents a question of fact depending upon all the circumstances under
which the offer was made.2 7 When the statutory period has already run and then
the offer is made, it may be admissible as an admission that the prior possession
was not hostile.28 Here again the offer may also be construed merely as an offer
to buy peace and to avoid litigation. The instant case may be questioned because
any issue as to hostility was apparently eliminated by the conceded fact that the
defendant actually possessed the land in hostility to any title held by the plaintiff,
for the required statutory period, before the discovery of the mutual mistake.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY-RECOVERY OF PROPERTY DELIVERED IN RELIANCE
UPON PROMISE-EFFECT OF ARTICLE 2-A OF NEw YORK CivIL PRACTICE ACT.-
Plaintiff brought an action to recover specific real property alleged to have been
given by him to defendant in reliance upon the defendant's fraudulent representa-
tions and promise of marriage. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint.
Held: motion granted; complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action, since the action was in reality based upon alleged breach of contract
to marry, and as such, has been outlawed by Article 2-A of the New York Civil
Practice Act. Morris v. Baird, - Misc. -, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 779 (Sup. Ct. 1945). 1
In its opinion the court indicated that had the question been an open one, it would
have held that the action was not barred by Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act.
The court was of the opinion that Article 2-A of the Act was intended to bar actions
for money damages only (which were not requested by this plaintiff in the instant
case), and that the New York legislature's intent was not to have the statute apply
to prevent recovery of specific property given upon a promise of marriage. How-
ever, the court, bowing to the rule of stare decisis and, solely upon the authority
of the case of Josephson v. Dry Dock Savings Institution,2 previously decided by
title in the person to whom the offer is made, and that single act of acknowledgment by
the disseisor is fatal to his claim."
26. Warren v. Bowdran, 156 Mass. 280, 283, 31 N. E. 300, a01 (1892).
27. Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 270, 166 S. W. (2d) 81 (1942).
28. Headerick v. Fritts, 92 Tex. 270, 24 S. W. 11 (1893).
1. The complaint in the present case was later amended by the plaintiff to allege
that the agreement to marry between plaintiff and defendant had been mutually rescinded,
and that thereafter the defendant refused to return to plaintiff the realty conveyed to her
in contemplation of their marriage. The plaintiff, in this later action, prayed the aid of
equity to restore the property to him. The court rejected defendant's continued claim
that even this action was barred by Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act, and, while not
mentioning the issue raised by the principal case, held that the action was not one to
recover money damages and was not brought for breach of the contract to marry, since
that contract had been mutually rescinded. Morris v. Baird, - Misc. -, 57 N. Y. S.
(2d) 398, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The Appellate Division reversed in Morris v. Baird,
- App. Div. -, 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 890 (2d Dep't 1945) on the authority of Josephson.v.
Drydock Savings Institution, 292 N. Y. 666, 56 N. E. (2d) 96 (1944) and Andie v. Kaplan,
263 App Div. 884, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 429 (2d Dep't 1942), aff'd, 288 N. Y. 685, 43 N. E.
(2d) 82 (1942).
2. 292 N. Y. 666, 56 N. E. (2d) 96 (1944).
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the Court of Appeals, granted the defendant's motion for dismissal. The Josephson
decision was merely an affirmance by the Court of Appeals without opinion of an
order of the Appellate Division, affirming-also without opinion--a judgment of
Special Term dismissing plaintiff's action for replevin of an engagement ring and
two other articles of jewelry given by plaintiff to defendant upon the consideration
of their engagement and apparently dependent upon their agreement to marry. In
the Josephson case the plaintiff claimed that the condition upon which the property
was delivered had failed, and that ownership and right of possession therefore re-
verted to plaintiff. In affirming the opinion of Special Term, which granted defend-
ant's motion for dismissal of plaintiff's action, both the Appellate Division and
the Court of Appeals cited the case of Andie v. Kaplan.3 In that case a similar
complaint by plaintiff was dismissed. The complaint averred that, relying on de-
fendant's promise of marriage, plaintiff delivered cash to her to hold for him and
also presented her with jewelry. The Appellate Division decided by a three to two
vote that these facts did not state a cause of action on plaintiff's part because
Section 61 of Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act,4 which outlawed actions for breach
of promise and collection of money damages based thereon, was applicable. There
was no majority opinion, but the minority, including the Presiding Justice, wrote
a vigorous dissent. It should be noted that this minority opinion constitutes the
only statement of legal reasoning by appellate courts on the point which can be
found. 5
To decide whether the current trend of New York decisions on this.point is in
conflict with the spirit or the letter, or both, of the pertinent sections of the Civil
Practice Act,6 we must look at the background preceding passage of this legislation,
as well as try to determine the intent of the legislature in passing it. The common
law contemplated that serious mutual promises of marriage constituted valid con-
sideration and that a binding legal contract thereupon arose.7 Usually such a contract
was formally manifested by engagement or betrothal, although this was not neces-
sary. The contract could of course be cancelled by mutual consent.8 The legal
3. 263 App. Div. 884, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 429 (2d Dep't 1942); aff'd without op., 288
N. Y. 685, 43 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942).
4. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 61-a contains a legislative declaration of the public policy
which motivated the enactment of the legislation. See note 25 infra. Section 61-b reads
as follows: "The rights of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as damage
for the alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of promise to
marry are hereby abolished."
5. This is true if we except the very short dissent by Justice Cunningham in Zawadski
v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 219 (4th Dep't 1938) and the opinion in
the second phase of the principal case, see note 1 supra
6. See note 4 supra.
7. The court said in Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S. W. (2d) 27 (1934), that
marriage contracts may be supported by the mutual promises of the parties alone. But
it goes on to say: "... if the contracting parties choose to pay or promise an additional
consideration, they will be bound thereby just the same as in commercial transactions."
8. See note 1 supra and Unger v. Hirsch, 180 Misc. 381, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 965 (City
Ct. 1943). In an action by plaintiff for breach of promise to marry, the evidence showed
that the plaintiff had indicated to the defendant that he (the defendant) might end their
engagement at his option; that he thereupon ceased his visits, courted another without
objection by the plaintiff, and later married the other. Held, that defendant was released
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problem arose when one party breached the agreement without consent of the
other. Recovery of money damages was then available as a remedy to the aggrieved
party, male or female-although in practice this action was rarely brought by the
male. 9 Only positive proof of fraud on the part of the plaintiff was a defense
to this action, if the contract to marry could be shown and there had been no
mutual rescission.' 0
In more recent times the common law action for breach of promise to marry
became subject to grave abuses, as did (to a lesser extent) the allied actions of
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction. l' A storm of public
protest led in many states to modification or abolition of these so-called "heart
balm" actions. Among the first of the states was New York.' 2 In 1936 Article 2-A
of the Civil Practice Act became law. By its provisions, the common law rights
of action to recover "heart balm" as a result of alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction, and breach of promise to marry were abolished. Many
competent authorities have since been of the opinion that, aside from the question
of constitutionality, the legislature went too far in completely abolishing these
common law actions-that such a drastic remedy was uncalled for.'3 Be that as
it may, the statute has been upheld as constitutional on the ground that it was within
the proper exercise of the legislature's police power to modify. and protect, in the
public interest, the institution of marriage.1 4
It is to be noted that the statute, by its terms, requires liberal treatment.' 5 The
from his prior engagement by mutual consent of the parties thereto. Kellet v. Robie, 99
Wis. 303, 74 N. W. 781 (1898).
9. "The general rule as to actions upon contracts is, that the plaintiff can only recover
a compensation for the damages he has sustained by the breach of the defendant, and
exemplary or punitory damages are not allowed. To this rule an action for breach of
contract of marriage is an exception, and, as far as I can now call to mind, the only
exception. As to the measure of damages, this action has always been classed with actions
of tort .... " Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N. Y. 474, 477 (1870).
10. A woman's suppression of the fact that a divorce had been obtained from her on
account of her vicious disposition and cruel conduct, when stating that she had obtained
a divorce from her husband for his cruelty, constitutes a fraudulent concealment and
misrepresentation which will justify a breach of contract to marry her. Van Houten v.
Morse, 162 Mass. 414, 38 N. E. 705 (1894).
11. Actions for breach of promise to marry especially were considered a legalized
"racket" by the public. Laymen largely lost sight of the original useful and valuable pur-
pose of such actions in the cry raised against them. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy
(1936) 5 FoRD m L. Rxv. 63, 66.
12. The various state enactments are referred to in Professor Feinsinger's article, Current
Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry, Alienation of Affections, and Related
Actions (1935) 10 Wis. L. Rzv. 417.
13. Id. at 430. "There are respectable opinions to the effect that undue newspaper
publicity has caused the public to ignore the private and public benefits of the actions
discussed and has given to isolated cases of abuse the appearance of universality."
14. Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N. Y. 570, 10 N. E. (2d) 556 (1937), mod'g, 274 N. Y.
22, 8 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937), app. dismissed, 302 U. S. 641 (1937); Fearon v. Treanor, 273
N. Y. 645, 8 N. E. (2d) 36 (1937), mod'g, 272 N. Y. 268, 5 N. E. (2d) 815 (1936),
app. dismissed, 301 U. S. 667 (1937).
15. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT, Art. 2, § 61-h. This section states that the article is to be
liberally construed to effect the objects of the legislature in enacting it.
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usual rule is, of course, that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed, and at least one New York court has stated that the general
rule should be followed in construing this particular statute.16 This dictum would
seem to be questionable, however, in view of the last clause of the legislation under
discussion, which provides in express terms that it be construed liberally. 17 Nor
may it be avoided by indirection, for instance, by bringing action of fraud or
deceit alleging that the plaintiff had been injured by the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions of the defendant, who never intended to live up to the promise of marriage.
The courts have often made the statement, speaking generally, that a plaintiff will
not be allowed to transform a cause of action in contract into a cause of action
in tort,'3 and this latter view has been the one applied by New York courts in
preventing plaintiffs from avoiding the bar of the statute by bringing an action
sounding in tort'rather than contract. For instance, the court held in Sulkowski v.
Szewczyk, 19 that an action for damages based on defendant's falsely representing
that he was unmarried, is within the bar of the statute. Of course if there has
been such a basic change of position by the plaintiff as a consummation of the
marriage ceremony due to defendant's fraudulent representations, the case is differ-
ent. For instance in Snyder v. Snyder,2' it was held that an action to recover
damages arising out of a consummated bigamous marriage induced by the defendant's
false representations is not within the prohibition of the statute. The court pointed
out that the action was not based upon breach of promise to marry. In a strict
sense the promise to marry had been performed. The damage claimed resulted from
the tortious act of entering into a putative marriage. There is also a question
whether a contract made in consideration of marriage, as distinguished from a con-
tract to marry, would come within the bar of the statute. In the former type of
16. Unger v. Hirsch, 180 Misc. 381, 382, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 965, 967 (City Ct. 1943).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. An action for breach of a contract duty is none the less sustainable as solely an
action on contract because the complaint alleges a tortious misappropriation and conver-
sion by defendant of the money sought to be recovered. Tuers v. Tuers, 100 N. Y. 196,
2 N. E. 922 (1885). An action to recover back moneys paid upon a contract which has
been repudiated by plaintiff on the ground of fraud is an action in quasi-contract. Freer
v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492 (1875). The New York courts seem also to have held tradition-
ally that the proper remedy for breach of promise of marriage was a contract action,
rather than one based on tort due to defendant's fraudulent representations and promises,
deceit, etc. See language in Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb. 323, 327 (1850) for an expression
of this view.
19. 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (4th Dep't 1938). This case is cited with
approval in A. B. v. C. D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E. D. Pa. 1940), aff. on op. below in 123 F.
(2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 691 (1941).
20. The court implied that if the plaintiff's contentions were to be accepted as correct
law, then any action based upon a breach of promise to marry could be automatically
turned into an action for misrepresentations-a tort action-merely by alleging that the
promise of marriage was a sham, made solely for the purpose of taking advantage of
the plaintiff. But the court expressly left open, as not required for decision, the question
whether the plaintiff might maintain an action to recover articles given to the defendant
as presents, or the value thereof. See note 19 supra.
21. 172 Misc. 204, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 815 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The court declared that
such an action: ". . . is not one which is subject to abuse or manipulation by unscrupulous
persons. It is neither within the letter nor the intendment of the law."
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contract the consideration is not confined to the mutual promises to marry, but
also includes additional consideration furnished by one party to the other, such as
a promise to do something or give something else by one or both parties.22 At first
glance it would seem that such agreements well might come under the bar, due to
the section of the statute providing for a "liberal construction."2 3 At least insofar
as an action on such a contract is brought because of the failure of a party thereto
to go through with the marriage, the plaintiff, it would appear, must necessarily
allege the breach of the promise to marry in order to recover damages.
However, while the provision as to liberal construction of the statute eliminates-
and rightly so-attempts to recover money damages resulting from breach of promise
to marry, even when the plaintiff attempts to disguise such claim under a different
theory of action, yet it would not seem that the intent, spirit, or purpose of the
statute requires elimination of the type of case we are at present concerned with.
It does not seem to have been the intent of the legislature to preclude recovery in
any action to recover property, merely because proof of the establishment of the
cause of action may incidentally be based on a breach of a contract to marry, as
decisions in New York courts seem to imply. It would appear that the type of action
brought in the principal case does not fall within the condemnation of the statute.
The letter of the statute does not bar the action; an action to recover specific
realty or personalty is not an action "to recover money daimages." Even a liberal
construction would not appear to permit the expression "money damages" to include
specific property, or its money equivalent where recovery of such specific property
is impossible.24 A liberal construction is not necessarily a free construction. The
statutory mandate requiring a liberal construction is clearly modified by the state-
ment of legislative intent, found in Section 61-a.2- The denial of recovery in a
case such as the principal case will frustrate the legislature's expressed intent and
defeat its purpose. Especially is this true in the present case, where the practical
result of this curious process of judicial inversion is to achieve a result against
which the legislation seems aimed directly, i.e., the unjust enrichment stemming from
breach of a contract of marriage.
The policy behind the statute would not appear to prevent recovery of specific
property delivered as a conditional gift. The most usual instance where this would
occur is found in the case of an engagement ring, given to the betrothed conditionally
upon the marriage. Nearly all jurisdictions have held that, in such a case, the ring
is recoverable by the party who gave it, if the donee breaks her promise to marry.2 6
22. The difference between these two types of contracts is well described in Morgan
v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316, 322 (1850).
23. See note 15 supra.
24. Section 1116 of the New York Civil Practice Act points out that a plaintiff may
recover the value of goods in a replevin action if it is impossible to replevy the goods
themselves. In such an action, the value recovered is not to be considered as damages,
but as an essential ingredient of the replevin action itself.
25. Section 61-a reads in part as follows: ". . . such remedies 'having been exercised
by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished
vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in many cases having
resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy of the
state that the best interests of the people of the state will be served by the abolition
of such remedies."
26. Beck v. Cohen, 237 App. Div. 729, 262 N. Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1933); Jacobs
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Of course the token element, which differentiates the engagement ring from other
gifts, is to be noted.2 7 But the rule is by no means limited to the case of an engage-
ment ring. The majority of jurisdictions hold it extends to any property which is
the subject of a gift, if it can be definitely proved that such gift was made ex-
pressly conditional upon marriage.2 8 But the mere making of gifts during the
engagement period does not spell out an implied condition subsequent permitting
the retaking of such gifts in the event of breach of the contract of marriage by the
donee. Only if clear evidence is shown that there was an understanding that the
gifts were made conditionally, may they lYe recovered by the donor.29 In these
decisions the eventual marriage seems to be looked upon as a condition subsequent
which, if not carried out, will serve to void the gift and make such property recover-
able on that ground at the option of the owner. It might well be argued that
Article 2-A does not act as a bar where the action is brought to recover the gift
since the plaintiff is not seeking "money damages" but specific property. On the
other hand, it must be admitted that in such an action the plaintiff, in order to
recover, must allege and prove the breach of the contract. -It is true that the condi-
tion subsequent which fails to occur is the promised marriage, but it would seem
to be a narrow (not liberal) interpretation of the statute to deny recovery simply
because the failure of the condition may incidentally amount to a breach of a
promise to marry.
The importance and apparent frequency of the wrong alleged in this type of
action would appear to call for a more considered treatment of the problem by the
higher appellate courts of New York. The dearth of judicial interpretation of
Article 2-A, as applied to actions to recover specific property, leaves the law in
a state of uncertainty. Should the Court of Appeals definitely sustain what appears
to be the prevalent view, it may be that the legislature in the interests of justice
should consider clarifying legislation for the protection of those who otherwise
may suffer inequitable loss through the instrumentality of the very statutes designed
originally to shield them.
v. Davis, (1917) 2 K. B. 532; Ruehling v. Hornung, 98 Pa. Super Ct. 535 (1930); Sloin
v. Lavine, 168 Atl. 849 (1933); GOODEVE, PERSoNAL PROPERTr (8th ed. 1937) 246.
27. Jacobs v. Davis, (1917) 2 K. B. 532, illustrates the unique significance attached to
the gift of an engagement ring, which: ". . . retains its character of a pledge or some-
thing to bind the bargain or contract to marry."
28. The prevailing view in the United States and England seems to follow the Roman
law in placing weight upon the fault of the parties. Thus it has been held that money
advanced in consideration of a promise to marry, subsequently broken by donee, may
be recovered back. Cushing v. Hughes, 119 Misc. 39, 195 N. Y. Supp. 200 (Sup. Ct.
1922); Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, 20 Atl. 279 (1890). The same rule applicable
to gifts of money is also applicable to other gifts in contemplation of marriage. Thus,
gifts of jewels and furs have been recovered back where donee is at fault, Antaramian v.
Ourakian, 118 Misc. 558, 194 N. Y. Supp. 100 (Sup. Ct. 1922); a gift of a piano, although
absolute in form, was held conditional on marriage, Lumsden v. Arbaugh, 207 Mo. App.
561, 227 S. W. 868 (1921). However, it is essential that the presence of the conditional
element in the gift be shown by clear evidence, in order for plaintiff to recover. Rosenberg
v. Lewis, 210 App. Div. 690, 206 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1st Dep't 1924). Louisiana has held
a gift in contemplation of a future marriage void if the marriage does not take place,
regardless of whether donee or donor is at fault. Decuers v. Bourdet, 10 La. App. 361,
120 So. 880 (1929).
29. Rosenberg v. Lewis, 210 App. Div. 690, 692-693, 206 N. Y. Supp. 353, 354 (1st
Dep't 1924).
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CONFLICT OF LAws-APPLIcABiLITY OF SECTION 61-b OF THE GENERAL CORPORA-
TION LAyv OF NENv YORK IN FEDERAL CouRTS.--The plaintiff, a minority stockholder,
brought a derivative stockholder's action in the Federal Court of New York, against
the directors of the defendant corporation, a Delaware corporation, on grounds of
diversity of citizenship asking for an accounting by the directors of stock allegedly
transferred for an inadequate consideration. The defendant corporation made a
motion to require the plaintiff to give security for expenses, including counsel fees
which might be incurred by the corporation and other parties defendant which the
corporation might be required to pay pursuant to Section 61-b of the General Cor-
poration Law. Held, motion denied. Section 61-b is a procedural and not a substan-
tive statute, and, accordingly the federal courts will not apply the statute. Boyd v.
Bell, et al., N. Y. L. J., July 14, 1945, p. 85, col. 6.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York1 had been decided just prior to the
decision in the principal case. The rule laid down in the Guaranty Trust Company
case is a logical corollary of the principle announced in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
2
in that the former decision requires federal courts sitting in equity, in diversity of
citizenship cases, to apply state-created and promulgated substantive equitable
principles. The Supreme Court stated: "To make an exception to Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins on the equity side of a federal court is to reject the considerations of
policy which, after long travail, led to that decision:" 3 By this pronouncement the
Guaranty Trust Company decision closed the gap left open by Russell v. Todd,4
decided very shortly after the Tompkins case, when the Supreme Court had "no
occasion to consider the extent to which federal courts, in the exercise of the au-
thority conferred upon them by Congress to administer equitable remedies, are
bound to follow state statutes and decisions affecting those remedies." 5 The ques-
tion thus left open in the Todd case was to a great extent answered in the Guaranty
Trust Company decision. In the latter case the question presented was whether in
a diversity of citizenship case the federal courts would give effect to a state statute
of limitations barring prosecution of a suit in equity. The majority6 of the Supreme
Court answered in the affirmative. The majority of the Court interpreted the state's
"outlawry ' 7 of the equitable remedy, by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations,
as having such a vital, intimate and significant bearing on recovery as to constitute
a matter of substance s which the federal courts are bound to follow within the
1. - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
2. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
3. - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1471 (1945).
4. 309 U. S. 280 (1940).
5. Id. at 294.
6. Two Justices did not take part. Justice Rutledge wrote a dissent, in which Justice
Murphy joined.
7. Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464,
1469 (1945).
8. In Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464,
1469 (1945), Justice Frankfuiter said: "Matters of 'substance' and matters of 'procedure'
are much talked about in the books as though they define a great divide cutting across the
whole domain of law. But, of course, 'substance' and 'procedure' are the same key-words
to very different problems. Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure' represents the same in-
variants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for
which it is used." Cook, 'Characterization' in Conflict of Laws. (1941) 51 YXU L. J. 191,
197 et seq.
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rule of the Tompkins case. The majority of the Court were of the opinion that
the Statute of Limitations affected the equitable remedy in no mere negligible way
since it made the remedy unavailable. Apparently the question left unanswered in
the Todd case was answered: the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases are
bound to follow state statutes and decisionswhich intimately, vitally and significantly
affect the equitable remedy, even when such significant affect is accomplished through
a state statute generally denominated procedural.
The court in the principal case in holding that as a federal court it need not
apply the provisions of Section 61-b of the General Corporation Law, 9 quoted a
key passage1° from the majority opinion in the Guaranty Trust Company case, and
apparently interpreted the quoted passage to lay down the fundamental test an-
nounced in that case as follows: does the state statute "* * * significantly affect
the result of a litigation * * * ?" The court emphasized the foregoing expression,
quoted from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Guaranty Trust Company case,
by adding italics. No emphasis was placed upon the important adverb, "signifi-
cantly", which immediately preceded the italicized phrase. Having concluded, seem-
ingly, that the Supreme Court considered as binding in the federal courts only those
state statutes which "affect the result of a litigation", the court in the instant case
proceeded to consider whether or not Section 61-b had such an effect. In an apparent
paraphrase of the preceding quotation, the court concluded that since Section 61-b
did not "bear in any way upon the merits,"" the statute was procedural. Before
considering the actual result reached by the court, its reasoning should be analyzed.
It is submitted that the court misinterpreted the basic test announced by the
Supreme Court in the Guaranty Trust Company case in three important respects:
(1) by apparently de-emphasizing the qualifying adverbs "significantly", "vitally"
9. N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW, Section 61-b. This statute provides that in derivative stockhold-
er's actions brought by persons holding stock whose amount is less than 57o of the iggre-
gate outstanding shares of any class of such stock or whose value is not in excess of
$50,000.00, the defendant corporation in whose right the action is brought may, during
the proceeding, require the complainants to give security for the reasonable expenses which
it may incur during the suit, including counsel fees, and which it may be required to pay
subject to other provisions of law.
10. "The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and the means
by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such
statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our
problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court
to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim
by the same parties in a State court?" Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York,
- U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1470 (1945). Italics were added by the District Court in
the principal case.
11. The following quotation is taken directly from the court's o!Sinion after it had
cited cases wherein "substantive" rules of state law were applied in diversity cases: "These
cases all emphasize as substantive rules and law which clearly have a bearing upon the
direction in which judgment will go, in the result of the litigation. Here section 61-b
can have no such bearing. It does not bear in any way upon the merits. Whether the
security required was given or not asked, the determination of the merits would not be
in any way affected. Plaintiff would still be granted or denied relief depending upon
the proof, and not upon compliance with the statute." Boyd v. Bell, N. Y. L. J., July 14,
1945, p. 85, col. 6.
[Vol. 14
RECENT DECISIONS
and "intimately"' 2 used throughout the majority opinion in describing the affect .of
state statutes upon the enforcement of the right involved; (2) by substituting the
term "merits" for the word "result" which was actually used by the Supreme Court
in describing that which the statute affects; and (3) as a consequence of (1) and
(2), by falling into the over-simplified distinction between what is "substantive"
and "procedural"--an error against which Justice Frankfurter expressly warned in
the Guaranty Trust Company decision.'L
If the test of the applicability of state statutes in the federal courts in diversity
cases is their importance as a factor in the outcome14 of the case, such a test dove-
tails with the guiding principle which impelled the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins. That principle seeks the attainment of the same result in the federal courts
as in the courts of the state in which they sit.15 "Otherwise, the accident of diversity
of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in co-
ordinate state and federal courts sitting 'ide by side."' 6 Certainly from a practical
viewpoint Section 61-b "vitally", "intimately" and "significantly" affects the out-
come of the ordinary stockholders derivative suit.17 The effect of.such a drastic
curtailment is hardly formal and certainly not negligible. Considered from the stand-
point of the sought-for uniformity of state vnd federal decisions in diversity cases,
it seems undesirable that the very clear policy of the State Legislature promulgated
in Section 61-b should be avoided by instituting the suit in a federal court.'8
12. Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464,
1470 (1945).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. Clarke, Procedural Aspects of the New State Independence (1940) 8 Gao. WASHr.
L. REv. 1230.
i5. See A. Hand, J., dissenting in York v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York,
143 F. (2d) 503, 531 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). (1944) 44 CoL. L. REv. 915, 918-919, 921.
16. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496 (1941); Guaranty Trust Com-
pany of New York v. York, - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945) where at page 1470 the
Court said: "The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for
the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court
instead of in a State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result."
17. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York (1944)
32 CAli=. L. REv. 123, 125; Zlinkoff, The American Investor and the Constitutionality of
Section 61-b of the New York General Corporation Law (1945) 54 YAr L. J. 352,
359 et seq. Zlinkoff charged at page 370 that: "Obviously, therefore, the burdens which
Section 61-b places upon the average shareholder will make it totally impractical . . .
to maintain a derivative suit." Further on, an even stronger allegation was made. "Sec-
tion 61-b as a practical matter means the elimination of the right of small stockholders
to maintain derivative suits." In Shielcrawt v. Moffett, - Misc. -, 49 N. Y. S. (2d)
64 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd mem., 268 App. Div. 352, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 188 (1st Dep't 1944),
rev'd., 294 N. Y. 180, 61 N. E. (2d) 435 (1945), Justice Collins charged at page 73 that
"It would be denying the obvious to deny that the dire effect of the statute-if not the
deliberate purpose of it-is to bar stockholder's actions by making them excessively
costly and difficult."
18. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, "... the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the out-
come of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court." Guaranty Trust Company
of New York v. York, - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 1470 (1945). For the purpose of
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Moreover, it would not be very helpful in the solution of the problem presented
by the instant case to examine into the applicability in the federal courts of other
rules of state law under the decision of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and to attempt to
reason by analogy from decisions in respect to them. 19 Here, as so often occurs in
the law. the question depends upon a difference in degree. For instance, the signifi-
cance of a state rule as to burden of proof 20 or a state statute of limitations 21
upon the outcome of certain litigation presents no exactly comparable guide on
the impact of Section 61-b upon the outcome of a derivative stockholder's suit.
Similarly, that Section 61-b may have been denominated as a procedural statute
in determining questions other than its applicability in the federal court, is quite
immaterial. For instance, in Shielcrawt v. Moffett 2= the New York Court of Appeals
did not consider it necessary to pass upon the question whether Section 61-b was
"procedural" or "substantive" as those terms are used in discussing the retroactivity
or constitutionality of the legislation, 23 despite the fact that the lower courts had
determining the jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases ordi-
narily the stockholders of a corporation are by legal fiction presumed to be citizens of
the State in which the corporation was organized. Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 16 How.
314 (U. S. 1853). However, the legal fiction is disregarded in a derivative stockholder's
suit and diversity of citizenship may depend upon the alignment by the courts of the
corporation on the stockholder's or on the defendants' side of the controversy. The fed-
eral courts generally align the corporation on the defendants' side of the controversy on
the theory that the corporation is antagonistic to the suit, as evidenced by the directors'
refusal to sue. Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 (1905). 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRA cCE
(1938) 2272-2273. In the case of the large corporation with many stockholders widely
spread throughout the states, the opportunity for instituting suit in the federal courts
or removing it thereto, by careful selection of parties is self-evident.
19. The court in the principal case cited cases as examples where the federal courts
were obliged to follow state law governing limitations of actions, burden of proof, conflict
of laws, contributory negligence, measure of damages and interest, etc., because the rules
were "substantive" in nature.
20. In the principal case the court also cited Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S.
208 (1938); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Rogers, 126 F. (2d) 784 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942);
Alcaro v. Jordeau, 138 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U. S. 239 (1942). This last case would seem to be out of point because there
the Supreme Court reversing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, where a state
court entertains a suit under the Jones Act it is bound to follow the federal admiralty
rule as to burden of proof and not the state rule, because the Merchant Marine (Jones)
Act being an integral part of maritime law, rights fashioned by it are to be implemented
by admiralty rules not inconsistent with the Act.
21. Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945);
cf. Holmberg et al. v. Armbrecht, 150 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
22. 294 N. Y. 180, 61 N. E. (2d) 435 (1945), rev'g, 268 App. Div. 352, 51 N. Y. S. (2d)
188 (1st Dep't 1944); - Misc. -, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
23. In the Shielcrawt case, there was an attempt to apply Section 61-b to a suit which
had been commenced prior to its passage. The determination whether the statute was sub-
stantive or procedural was important in ascertaining its constitutionality, in as much as
it was claimed that as a retroactive rule of substantive law the statute would be un-
constitutional. However, the Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower courts, held that
since there was no express indication of retroactivity the statute could not be construed
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viewed the legislation as remedial and procedural.2 In a subsequent phase of the
same litigation,2 5 the court determined that legislation of New Jersey,26 . similar to
Section 61-b, dealt with a matter of procedure and not of substance and that, ac-
cordingly, the New York courts would not apply the New Jersey statute even
though the corporate defendant was a New Jersey corporation. Assuming that this
decision of a lower New York court represents the law of New York, a federal
court in New York, if the Shielcrawt suit were removed to that court, would be
bound on this conflict of laws question by the New York view that the New York
rather than the New Jersey statute would apply, if at all.27 But such a concession
would not answer the question whether or not the federal court should apply the
New York statute. The decision that the New Jersey equivalent of Section 61-b is
to be considered "procedural" from the conflict of laws viewpoint would not be
determinative on whether the federal court should, under the Tompkins decision,
apply Section 61-b in a suit which, aside from diversity of citizenship, would be
tried in the New York courts. In this connection one interesting feature of the
principal case should be noted. The corporate defendant is a Delaware corporation.
Delaware has no statutory requirement substantially equivalent to Section 61-b.
Nevertheless, Section 61-b by its terms applies to "any action instituted or main-
tained in the right of any foreign or domestic corporation * ** *.",2 and the New
York Appellate Division has in effect held the statute applicable to a foreign cor-
poration.29 Accordingly, the federal court sitting in New York is bound by that
determination on the conflict of laws question3 0 But, here again, it does not follow
that the federal court, in applying the test announced in the Guaranty Trust Com-
as such. For the purposes of the case, no importance was attached to the determination
of whether the statute was substantive or procedural.
24. The following dicta are taken from New York court opinions wherein the applica-
bility of Section 61-b as a "procedural" or "substantive" statute was involved: "On its
face the statute appears to change only remedial law by requiring the stockholder-plaintiff
to furnish security for defendants costs and reasonable expenses." Koch, J., in Citron v.
Mangel Stores Corp. et al., - Misc. -, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 416, (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd without
opinion, 268 App. Div. 905, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 754 (lst Dep't 1944). "It is my conclu-
sion, therefore, that Section 61-b is procedural in character and was intended' by the
Legislature to apply to pending actions." Collins, J., in Shielcrawt v. Moffett, - Misc. -,
49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd without opinion, 268 App. Div. 352, 51
N. Y. S. (2d) 188 (1st Dep't 1944). The dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division
intimated that the statute was remedial. Chief Judge Lehman of the Court of Appeals
said: "The statute we are considering differs from such purely procedural statutes [cost
statutes] both in purpose and effect." Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N. Y. 180, 190, 61 N. E.
(2d) 435, 439 (1945).
25. Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 184 Misc. 1074, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 134 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
26. N. J. S. A. (1945) 14:3-15
27. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941).
28. N. Y. Laws 1944, c. 688, effective April 9, 1944, adding Section 61-b to the NEw
Yomx GENERAx CoRPoRATroN LAW.
29. Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 268'App. Div. 352, 51 N. Y. S. (2d) 188 (1st Dep't 1944)
aff'g without opinion, - Misc. -, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 294 N. Y. 180, 61 N. E. (2d) 435 (1945).
30. Klaxon v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941); West v. American Tel. and Tel.,
.311 U. S. 223 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940).
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pany case, is bound by a New York decision denominating the statute as pro-
cedural for other purposes.
CONsTrTUToNAL LAW-UISDICION OF SUPREME COURT TO Rnvirw STATE COURT
CoNVICTIoN UNDER DuE Pocnss CrAUsE-CoNFrssioN OP AccuSED.-A police offi-
cer was murdered by robbers while escorting a manager of a theatre to a bank. The
defendant was implicated by others. He was arrested one morning and taken to a
Brooklyn hotel, where the police stripped him and kept him in a room, naked, from
8 am. to 11 am. He was then given his underwear and a blanket in which to wrap
himself. Some time later in the afternoon a convict, who had implicated him, was
left alone in the room with him. At about 6 pam. the defendant confessed. He
was retained in custody and intermittently questioned for three additional days.
A second confession was given on the fourth day after nine hours of questioning
at a police station. At the trial the jury, after instructions as to the inadmissibility
of involuntary confessions, returned a verdict of first degree murder, and the de-
fendant was sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed by the New York
Court of Appeals, and a writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme CourL With
four justices dissenting, it was held, conviction reversed, on the ground that an
involuntary confession had been admitted against the defendant- Malimki v. People
of the State of New York, - U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 781 (1945).
The boundaries limiting the Supreme Court's power to review state court con-
victions for crime are apparently not yet in sight. In recent years this court has
rendered several significant opinions interpreting the admissibility of evidence under
the due process clauses of both the Fifth' and Fourteenth2 Amendments. In the
former Amendment the phrase has been taken to empower the highest court to
reverse convictions secured in the lower federal courts when evidence has been
admitted, against a defendant in violation of Acts of Congress or the rules of evi-
dence binding on the federal courts which have been promulgated and interpreted
by the Supreme Court.3 A more limited power of supervision is wielded by the
Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment in sifting state court convictions
for crime. It is recognized that the court has no authority to make new findings
of fact. 4 Any review must be undertaken on the basis of the uncontrovertible facts.5
Nor can the Supreme Court intervene to decide whether the state laws regarding
the legality of evidence have been complied with-6 The character of its capacity to
1. U. S. Coiqsr. AEND. V.
2. U. S. CoNsT. AmEm. XIV § 1.
3. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943) wherm a confession obtained by
Federal officers in violation of the laws of Congress was excluded. But cf. United States
v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65 (1944) where a confession was admitted when the illegal custody
occurred subsequent to it. Cf. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937); Funk v.
United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933); Grau v. United States, 287 U. S. 124 (1932); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
4. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 238 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S.
227, 239 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 287 (1936).
5. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 602 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S.
143, 152 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 238 (1941).
6. Buchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427, 429-430 (1943); Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S.
425, 434 (1905). "One finds little evidence in reviewing the decisions of an attempt on
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review convictions under the doctrine of due process may be generally stated as
the right to investigate whether the accused has been accorded a fair and impartial
trial.7 The admission- of, coerced and involuntary confessions is widely recognized
as a violation of the requisite fairness, which the due process clause guarantees
to a defendant.8 In investigating this element, the exact question to be determined
has been whether the confession admitted in evidence was freely given.9 It has
been frequently stated that no exact formula for determining this question can be
established.' o An independent examination of the indisputable facts must be made'1
and the stress of. physical and psychological pressure evaluated.' 2 When the jury
in the state court has been fairly instructed as to the in admissibility of confessions
involuntarily secured, the Supreme Court may not disturb the findings of the triers
of fact, if reasonable men could reasonably differ as to the coercive effect of external
forces upon the will of the accused.' 5 Only when the weight of the undeniable facts
shows that the confession has been the product of intimidation, fear or coercion
may the state court's determination be set aside.' 4 All factors tending to show the
the part of the court to dictate any set form of procedure in the disposal of state criminal
cases." Nutting, The Supreme Court, The Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Cases
(1936) 3 U. or Cm. L. RLv. 244, 246.
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45, 67 (1932); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 106, 111, 112 (1908); Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 434 (1905);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
8. This view is held with reference to both federal and state convictions. On coerced
confessions in the federal jurisdictions, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943);
Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1 (1924); Wilson v. United States; 162 U. S. 613 (1896).
That an involuntary confession may not be used in state trials has been held in Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (194); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
9. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 237 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547
(1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 238, 239 (1940); Wan v. United States, 266
U..S. 1, 14 (1924); Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 549 (1897); Brown v. Walker,
161 U. S. 591,.596 (1896); Counselnan v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 573 (1892).
10. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1942), "That which may, in one setting,
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,
may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such
denial. In the application of such a concept, there is always the danger of falling into.
the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules, the application
of which in a given case may be to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed." Also
see Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 602 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219,
236 (1941); Hopt v. Utah, "110 U. S. 574, 583 (1884).
11. See supra note.5.
12. Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227
(1940); White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629 (1940).
13. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 602 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547,
555 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236-238 (1941).
14. See supra note 5. The limits of the power of the Supreme Court to review the
evidence is restricted to an examination of the undisputed facts, and it may not usurp
the jury's province to weigh the probative effect of conflicting evidence or to determine the
inferences to be drawn therefrom. The Supreme Court may not make additional findings
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exact import of compelling forces may be considered. The age, health, education,
intelligence and race of the defendant 15 are commonly evaluated in the light of such
attendant circumstances as the duration of custody, length of questioning, accessi-
bility of relatives and counsel, hostility of questioners, and the existence of physical
force and psychological pressure.' 6 Although the broader principle of the Supreme
Court power to review state court convictions are well-established and freely con-
ceded, several relatively recent decisions of that court have shown that there is
an absence of unanimity in applying them to the diverse factual situations with
which the court has been confronted.
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee'7 the Court reversed a conviction for murder secured
by the admission of a confession procured by police officers after thirty-six hours
of uninterrupted questioning. That decision has been interpreted by many to hold
that the mere length of interrogation is, as a matter of law, coercive.' 8 Exception
may be taken to such an interpretation on the ground that theretofore the courts
had refused to recognize a standard of evaluation, choosing rather to decide whether
under the facts of each case the confession of guilt was in fact freely given. 19 A
study of the opinions written in the Ashcraft case, and the facts that raised the issue
of coercion, suggest that there was no intention to depart from the previously
established principles. Although it has been generally accepted that the period of
thirty-six hours of uninterrupted questioning was in itself the determining factor
in the Ashcraft reversal, the majority opinion, in its independent examination of
the admitted and uncontroverted facts, mentions four distinct elements that consti-
tuted the coercive situation: (a) a period of thirty-six hours questioning (b) by an
uninterrupted relay of questioners (c) with a failure to grant the accused a period
for rest, (d) conducted in secrecy. 20 The court placed its greatest emphasis upon
of fact, nor may the court reverse unless a substantial right of the defendant has been
invaded. However, the state legislatures sometimes have conferred broad powers of review
on the state appellate courts. N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. Sec. 528 provides that in a capital
case the Court of Appeals may order a new trial "if it be satisfied that the verdict was
against the weight of evidence or against law, or that justice requires a new trial, whether
any exception shall have been taken or not in the court below." People v. Crum, 272 N. Y.
348, 6 N. E. (2d) 51 (1937).
15. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 162 (1944), Jackson, J., dissenting, "For
its bearing on this question the Court has always considered the confessor's strength or
weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent or moronic, well or ill, Negro
or white." See Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941), where coercive conduct was
found to be without effect on an intelligent business man; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.
278 (1936), where the confession of an ignorant Negro was held inadmissible because of
force. Consideration was given to his lack of education.
16. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. S. 544 (1941);
White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629 (1940).
17. 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
18. (1944) 57 H~Auv. L. Rzv. 919, 920, 921; (1944) 28 MARQ. L. REV. 125, 127; (1944)
20 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 236, 239.
19. Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 238,
239 (1940); Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 14 (1924); Brain v. United States, 168
U. S. 532, 549 (1897).
20. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 154 (1944), where Justice Black considered
the probable effect of compelling forces. "It is inconceivable that any court in the land,
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the duration of the questioning and the attendant physical and mental weariness
that must have resulted, but the reasoning of the court shows that it did not fail
to consider other elements as part of the same situation. In condemning the conduct
of the police officials, the court characterized as "inherently coercive" the whole
of the surrounding circumstances, and did not limit itself to the effect of a lengthy
interrogation alone. Such a view is not inconsistent with established authority. To.
determine the fact of voluntariness the courts have recognized their inability to-
establish exactly the thin line separating freedom of the will and psychological
coercion and have been content to accept the probable effect of external pressure.21
When the forces, either physical or psychological, brought to bear upon the mind
of the suspect are so compelling that they offend an innate sense of fairness, the
courts have "felt free to declare that coercion existed. ' 22 The majority of the court
in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, viewing the elements of the situation producing the con-
fession, reversed on that ground.
The refusal of the Court to reverse a conviction for murder in Lyons v. Okla-
hoina23 seems to substantiate such an interpretation of the Ashcraft case. Although
the precise point considered was whether a prior confession, admittedly coerced, was
sufficient to vitiate a later confession secured in the same tenure of custody, 2 '
when viewed in certain of its aspects, the decision casts some light on broader
questions. The defendant, Lyons, had been questioned by the state officers for a.
period of twenty-six to twenty-eight hours. The fact that the court did not advert
to the question of duration even so far as to reject the time element as insufficient
indicates that other elements constituting the Ashcrajt pronouncement were obvi-
ously not present. This is seen to be so. The questioning of Lyons was conducted.
by a group of men but not an uninterrupted relay. It was not a continuous ques-
tioning, for the prisoner was returned to his cell for several hours betweep the first
and second confession. Finally the questioning could not rightfully be termed secret
for after the first admittedly coerced confession the prisoner was conducted to the
penitentiary by the deputy sheriff in the company of at least one private citizen.
Pregnant in the failure of the court specifically to consider the length of questioning
conducted as our courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays
to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-examination for thirty-six hours with-
out rest or sleep in an effort to extract a 'voluntary' confession. Nor can we, consistently
with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do
the same thing away from the restraining influences of a public trial in an open court room."
21. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547
(1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
22. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that state criminal
trials "shall be consistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1926). Also see Buchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427,
429 (1943); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112 (1935); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 326 (1915).
23. 322 U. S. 596 (1944).
24. In this connection the holdings reject the contention that a set standard or pre-
sumption may be raised. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1941); Hopt v. Utah, 110
U. S. 574, 583 (1884). A prior coerced confession may of course be evaluated as aq
influence, but the exact point to be determined is whether the confession was in fact
voluntary. Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219,
237 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 287 (1936).
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is the principle that it alone cannot give rise to a presumption of violation of due
process. The second significant aspect of the Lyons case is the insistence of the
majority opinion upon the well-established doctrine that no hard and fast rule for
determining the weight of external pressure can be stated2 5 and that the final
determinant in every case is the effect of all the circumstances upon the mind of
the defendant.2 6 As has been indicated, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, is not inconsistent
with that doctrine. An appraisal of the Lyons and Ashcraft decisions indicates that
the Supreme Court prior to the case now under discussion, recognized that its power
to reverse state court convictions for crime exists only when an evaluation of the
undisputed evidence shows that external forces brought to bear upon the accused
were so coercive in character that they were inconsistent with mental freedom.
Justice Douglas wrote for the majority of the Court in the case under considera-
tion. His decision to reverse the conviction was founded upon the fact that the law
enforcement officers had led the accused to believe that his failure to confess would
lead to a "shellacking" and that the confession was therefore the product of fear.
Such a determination would place his decision well within the recognized doctrine
that demands an evaluation of the effect of outside forces upon the mind of the
accused. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Stone takes no exception to such a
conclusion, but disagrees most strongly as to the manner in which Justice Douglas
examined the evidence of coercion. It is expressly stated by the latter that the
controlling facts, which show that the confession was involuntary, are extracted,
not from the uncontroverted evidence, but from the remarks of the prosecutor in
summation. The dissenting Justices take issue with the majority on this point, con-
tending that such remarks made by one who did not testify, was apparently not
present at the scene of the confession, and thus had no personal knowledge of the
alleged coercion, are not grounds for reversing a state conviction for crime.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to intervene in a state criminal trial because
of the admission of an involuntary confession exists only when the indisputable
evidence would not permit an unprejudiced jury to find that it was freely given, and
this limitation has been repeatedly acknowledged by that body.21 It is the failure
of Justice Douglas to observe the traditional application of that rule which serves
as the point of departure for Chief Justice Stone's dissent. The majority opinion
admits that the evidence before the jury would not stamp Malinski's confession as
coerced, and then proceeds to quote remarks of the prosecutor in summation which
in the opinion of the court upsets the balance in the direction of involuntariness.
In effect the court deals, not with the unchallenged evidence, but with conflicting
testimony viewed in the light of the statements made in summation. The function
of Supreme Court review is not to act as a super-jury 2s nor to calculate the weight
25. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 602 (1944). "No formula to determine this
question by its application to the facts of a given case can be devised."
26. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 602 (1944). "The question of whether those
confessions subsequently given are themselves voluntary depends on the inferences as to
the continuing effect of the coercive practices which may fairly be drawn from the sur-
rounding circumstances."
27. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 602 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S.
143, 152 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 239 (1940).
28. Chief justice Stone dissenting, "It is not the function of this court, in reviewing,
on constitutional grounds, criminal convictions by state courts, . . . to sit as a super
jury." - U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 781, 798 (1945). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S.
219, 238 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 287 (1936).
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of disputed testimony. Remarks in summation, delivered by an overzealous prose-
cutor, bent upon securing a conviction for a heinous.crime involving a police officer,
obviously attempting to show justification of the allegedly coercive methods of the
police, cannot be accorded the same weight as evidence introduced at the trial. It
may well have been conjecture, based upon hearsay reports of th6 circumstances
of the custody, and the conclusion the prosecutor drew was at best an opinion
formed to justify the coercion which he assumed to have existed. As such the
inferences he made were not uncontroverted facts and the court under recognized
principles was not justified in resolving the disputed issue by according the remarks
conclusively probative value.
It is recognized that in a civil suit the court may order a dismissal if the plaintiff's
attorney impeaches his client's case in his opening address.29 But the reasons for
that rule would not seem to justify the court in according the weight of admissions
to a summation. In the former situation it is presumed that the attorney has been
informed by his client of all the pertinent facts, and thus his presentation of those
adverse to his claim may be deemed binding upon his client. Remarks in summation
are of a different character. The facts have been 'educed and admitted as sworn
evidence upon the trial and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are matters for
a jury. At that point the parties presumably have assumed their positions as to
the disputed issues. It would not seem that it is then within the authority of the
attorney to take a position contrary to the evidence that has been established by
sworn witnesses and prejudicial to the interests of his client. Much less should the
declarations of the attorney be accorded credence when his views are not only
in conflict with testimony of sworn witnesses, but when in fact it has not been estab-
lished that he had any personal knowledge of the facts in issue, was not present
while they transpired and has based his conclusions on surmise.
Evaluating the Supreme Court's determination to reverse Malinski's conviction
on the basis set forth in the majority opinion, the dissent of Chief Justice Stone
seems to be the sounder view. Justice Douglas' analysis exhibits a tendency on the
part of the court to sit as a second trier of the facts and to resolve conflicting
evidence which the Supreme Court has previously acknowledged itself unauthorized
to examine. Several of the more recent decisions show an inclination to disregard
the verdict of the state juries and to ignore their findings in reexamining the facts.
It is of course within the province of the court to protect the constitutional guarantee
of due process by looking to the broad question of whether a fair and impartial trial
had been accorded. But the inherent suggestion in the subject case is that the
court is empowered to measure due process by standards subjective to the justices of
that court. If reexamination of the facts in dispute is to be sanctioned by the court,
and the determination of conflicting evidence subjected to the personal criteria of
its members rather than the traditional trial by jury, the doctrine of due process
as applied to criminal trials will take on a new meaning. The inference in the sub-
ject case would permit an almost undisciplined infringement upon the jurisdiction of
states over their own criminal process.
CoNsTrruTiONAL LAW- PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRMINATION -EMERGENCY
PRICE CONTROL ACT-GRANT OF IMMUNITY.--The Administrator of the Office of
Price Administration brought an action to recover treble .damages under § 205 (e)
29. Sweeney v. O'Dwyer, 197 N. Y. 499, 90 N. E. 1129 (1910); Hoffman House v.
Foote, 172 N. Y. 348, 65 N. E. 169 (1902); 4 CARmODY, NEW YORK CIVI PRAcTicE (2d
ed. 1932) § 1348, p. 3114.
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of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, for alleged overcharges
on sales by the defendants. The action was based on evidence secured by the
Administrator from the defendants under a subpoena duces tecum after the defend-
ants had refused to turn over such records voluntarily, claiming privilege and im-
munity against" self-incrimination. The evidence consisted of purchase and sale
invoices of dkendants. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence so obtained
on the ground that the use of the evidence violated the immunity provisions of the
Compulsory Testimony Act incorporated by reference into the Price Control Act.
Held: Motion dismissed. The records were not privileged because they were "quasi-
public." Bowles v. Amato, 60 F. Supp. 361 (D. C., D. Col. 1945).
The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed to all persons tried in federaO
courts by the Federal Constitution' and is embodied in most state constitutions.-
This guaranty of liberty extends to quasi-criminal proceedings to recover penalties
and forfeitures as well as to strictly criminal proceedings. 3 Thc privilege pertains
to papers, books and records kept by an individual as well as co information sought
to be elicited from him orally.4 However, since the privilege is a purely personal
one,5 in order that the privilege apply to books, papers and records, it is essential
that they be the private property of the person claiming the privilege or he must
possess the papers in a personal, as distinct from an official, capacity. So the privi-
lege does not apply to corporate books and papers in the custody of an officer or
individual even though surrendering them would make accessible a means of proving
the guilt of the person so surrendering.6 Nor does the privilege apply to public
records kept by a public officer, although the production of them would reveal
criminality on the part of the officer in whose custody they remain or by whom
they are prepared. 7 The courts correctly hold that such records are public property
and as such are open to inspection by public prosecutors. They are not the personal
property of the public officer who keeps them nor are they in his possession in a
personal capacity and he may not withhold them on a personal plea. He holds
them merely as a guardian for the public in order to fulfill a duty imposed on him
by his position.
1. "No person ...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... " U. S. CoisT. AiMEND. V.
2. Iowa and New Jersey are the only states which have not embodied this guaranty in
their constitutions. 8 WiontOax, EvIDEsNcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2252, n. 1.
3. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 634 (1886).
4. Id. at p. 633 wherein the court says: "And we have been unable to perceive that
the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself." In the Boyd
case a section of the Customs Revenue Law which required production of personal papers
and records in court, was held unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
5. 3 WHARTON, CPnRnAL EViDENcE (11th ed. 1935) § 1143. Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (1939) 29 MicH. L. REv. 8-10;
United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698 (1944) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383
(1914); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
6. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262
U. S. 151 (1923). This principle has been extended to exclude from the privilege books
and papers of large unincorporated associations. United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694
(1944), 13 FoaRDIT L. R1v. 238. Nor may a corporation claim the privilege for itself
through its officers. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
7. People v. Coombs, 158 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 527 (1899).
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In the instant case and in a series of cases recently decided8 under the Emergency
Price Control Act9 the courts have excluded from the privilege books and papers
kept in accord with the requirements of the statutes, on the ground that they are
"quasi-public" and as such the courts have held they are not included in the privilege.
The Emergency Price Control Act authorizes the Administrator to require that
records of the transactions sought to be .controlled by it be accurately kept and
open and subject to inspection at reasonable times and places.' 0 It also provides
that no person will be excused from complying with the Act because of his privilege
against self-incrimination. However, the Price Control Act does grant the immunity
contained in the Compulsory Testimony Act,1 ' which provides that no person claim-
ing the privileges shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture
because of any transaction about which he has been compelled to testify or produce
evidence before the designated administrative officers. This immunity is no broader
than the constitutional privilege' 2 and-so is limited to statements, books and records
which originally were protected by the privilege and which, without the compulsion
of the statute, may have been withheld under a plea of privilege. Compulsion is
also a necessary element. So where books and papers were voluntarily produced,
immunity could not be granted subsequently.' 3 Nor is the mere requirement of
keeping the books violative of the Fourth Amendment. 14
At the outset it is necessary to distinguish between the availability of the con-
stitutional privilege to corporations on the one hand and individuals on the other.
It is well-established that the privilege may not be claimed by a corporation'5 and
the courts have interpreted the immunity provision of the Compulsory Testimony
8. Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146 F. (2d) 774, 779 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944);
Bowles v. Glick Lumber Co., 146 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945); Bowles v. Poo, 58 F.
Supp. 841 (N. D. Cal. 1945); United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N. D. Iowa
1945); Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787 (N. D. Cal. 1944).
9. 56 STAT. 30 (1942), as amended, 58 STAT. 637, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 922 (1944)
which authorizes the Administrator to conduct hearings and provides for the compulsory
keeping and availability of records and papers that there may be suitable information for
the investigations. The WY.B. is similarly empowered under the Second War Powers
Act, 56 STAT. 185 (1942), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 643 (a) (1944).
10. 56 STAT. 30 (1942) as amended 58 STAT. 637, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 922 (b) (1944).
11. 27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U. S. C. § 46 (1934).
12. This immunity statute was originally enacted for the purpose of procuring evidence
which was not available because of the constitutional prohibition. The statute was first
suggested in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U. S. 547 (1892) wherein a statute was held unconstitutional because the immunity
granted there was not as broad as the constitutional privilege. The Compulsory Testimony
Act of 1893 was passed and later held constitutional in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.
591 (1896).
13. Bowles v. Poo, 56 F. Supp. 841 (N. D. Cal. 1945); United States v. Armour Co.,
142 Fed. 808 (N. D. Ill. 1906); United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N. D. Iowa
1945); Bowles v. Glick Lumber Co., 146 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945).
14. United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N. D. Iowa 1945). For a discussion of
the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment and its application to com-
pulsory inspection of books and records under a statute see, 8 WiGMoRE, EvwM_-cz (3d ed.
1940) §§ 2183, 2184.
15. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
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Act as not being broader than the privilege itself.' 6 It would seem, therefore, that
the immunity grant of the Compulsory Testimony Act was never intended to pro-
tect a corporation. The instant case, as well as others,'- however, involve a claim
of privilege by individual defendants, and it would seem that decisions bearing upon
the claim of privilege by corporations are not controlling in cases such as the
principal one.
First let us consider whether the books, records and documents which the Act
requires must be kept are, as the courts have designated them, "quasi-public" and
therefore, not privileged. The court in the instant case cites the decision in Rodgers
v. United States's which in turn relies upon certain language of the Supreme Court
in Wilson v. United States.19 The language in the Wilson case is dicta. The claim
of privilege there was in respect to corporate books and the court held that a
corporation, being a creature of the state and subject to its visitatorial powers, may
be compelled to produce its books. Furthermore, it was held that the corporate
books were not the private property of an officer or employee of the corporation
which could be withheld under a claim of privilege by him. In discussing the question
whether the personal privilege of a custodian of the corporate books attaches to
the books, the court said that public documents may not be withheld from inspection
on a plea of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and that "the
principle applies not only to public documents in public offices, but also to records
required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of
tiansactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation, and
the enforcement of restrictions validly established." 210 It would appear that the
quoted language was merely used to point up the distinction between the private
(i.e., personally owned) books and records of a party claiming the privilege and
the books and records of a state-created organization such as a corporation which
are public in the sense that they record the manner in which the franchises granted
by the state have been employed. 2' The right to exist and conduct business under
the corporate form is a privilege and the keeping of records available to the public
officers is a condition annexed to the grant of the privilege.
Similarly, as a prerequisite to engaging in certain activities affected with a public
interest, even natural persons may be required to be licensed and, as a compliance
with the license, keep books, which are open to inspection. There it may be said
that the books are of a quasi-public nature in the sense that their maintenance is
a condition of the public grant. Accordingly it has been held that such records are
16. See note 12 supra.
17. Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787 (N. D. Cal. 1944); Bowles v. Poo, 58 F. Supp.
841 (N. D. Cal. 1945); United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N. D. Iowa 1945).
18. 138 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943). This case is also relied upon in most of
the other O.P.A. cases. See, Bowles v. Glick Lumber Co., 146 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 9th,
1945).
19. 221 U. S. 361 (1922). The books and records may be "public" in another sense; as
being owned by a group collectively rather than by the individual members thereof. See
discussion in (1944) 13 FoRnnA. L. REv. 238.
20. Id. at 380.
21. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 75 (1906). Neither may the self-incrimination privi-
lege be claimed by a corporation as against investigation by the United States government.
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U. S. 707, 726-7. The Court wrote at p. 726:
"Our dual form of government necessarily authorizes the United States to exercise these
powers (the visitatorial powers of the state) in the vindication of its own laws."
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not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 22 Waiver of the privilege
in such a case is to be implied from the voluntary compliance with the condition
which consists in the furnishing of the information in question. So it has been held
not violative of an individual's constitutional rights to require him to be licensed
to drive on state highways and report accidents in which he has participated; 23 or
to require a licensed druggist to keep records of sales of intoxicating liquors open
to inspection.24 So Congress may in times of inflation oi scarcity prohibit, except
under license, the sale of goods and commodities, although such sale is customarily
an incident of ownership.25 Under the Emergency Price Control Act the Adminis-
trator is authorized to issue a license to those subject to the Act.26
In 1943, under this authorization, the Administrator issued a regulation acting
as a blanket license to all persons subject to the Act, with certain exceptions not
here pertinent 2 7 Examination of the effect of this regulation and of the Emergency
Price Control Act under which it is issued, is of value in determining the consti-
tutional rights of individual violators of the said Act under the Fifth Amendment.
The issuance of this license and continued sales by individuals subject to its provi-
sions amounf, it would seem, in effect to a complete waiver of their constitutional
right against self-incrimination. 28 The power of Congress to effect such a widespread
erasure of individual guaranties is not here challenged for under the vital purposes
22. United States v. Mulligan, 268 Fed. 893 (N. D. N. Y. 1920); Paladini v. Superior
Court, 178 Cal. 369, 173 Pac. 588 (1918).
23. People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530 (1913).
24. State v. Donovan, 10 N. D. 203, 86 N. W. 709 (1901); State v. Smith, .74 Ia. 580,
584, 38 N. W. 492, 493 (1888). Contra: State v. Pence, 173 Ind. 99, 89 N. E. 488 (1909).
25. In World War I, The Lever Act was passed, requiring dealers- in certain foods and
commodities to be licensed and to keep books and records. -In a case which arose in con-
nection with a violation of that Act, defendants refused to produce these books and records.
It was there held they were not entitled to refuse since the records were of a "quasi-public"
nature and that by accepting a license to do business defendant was deemed to have waived
the constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Mulligan, 268 Fed.
893 (N. D. N. Y. 1920). The Lever Act was later declared unconstitutional because of
indefiniteness of penalties. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921).
26. 56 STAT. 33 (1942) as amended, 58 STAT. 640, 50 U. S. C. A. APF § 925 (f) (1944).
27. Licensing Order No. I, Title 32, Ch. 11, pt. 1305, Code of Fed. Reg.
28. In United States v. Davis, 151 F. (2d) 140 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) decided since the
instant case, L. Hand, J., dicussing the privilege of individuals under the Emergency
Price Control Act stated the rationale of such legislation to be "that, when it has become
necessary to regulate a business in the public interest, those who continue in it thereafter
must be taken to have assented to the conditions imposed. The consequences of this theory
are indeed far-reaching; it is becoming more and more usual to regulate businesses in cases
of public emergency, a phrase which is confessedly exceedingly elastic. If any person al-
ready engaged in such a business must choose between abandoning his calling, or con-
senting to the surrender of his privilege against self-incrimination, when the regulations
provide for inspection, the scope of the privilege is considerably circumscribed. Neverthe-
less, we do not wish to suggest any doubt that, so far as concerns inspection, the regulations
are valid, or that Davis could not have been compelled by legal process to permit their
inspection." Cf. Shushan v. United States, 117 F. (2d) 110, 117 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), rehearing
denied, 314 U. S. 706 (1941); Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1, 8 (C. C. A.
5th, 1934), rev'd on other grounds, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388
(1935) ; United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 263 (1927).
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enumerated in the preamble to the Emergency Price Control Act,29 and the broad
powers granted by the Second War Powers Act,30 admittedly Congress may impose
such a condition where it will aid in the successful prosecution of the war by pre-
venting inflation. So it would appear that the implied waiver of the privilege which
underlies the reasoning of the licensing cases would sustain the decision in the
instant case. However, this specific ground while infrequently touched upon,3' does
not appear to have been relied upon by any of the decisions arising under this
section of the Emergency Price Control Act. The courts have denied the privilege
by relying heavily on the language in Wilson v. United States32 and by designating
the violators' books and records as "quasi-public". Neither the language in the
Wilson opinion nor the expression "quasi-public" articulate completely the idea
of implied waiver which would appear to be the correct rationale of the decision.
Another difficulty in interpretation arises from the physical position of the
immunity clause in the Emergency Price Control Act. Admittedly the grant of
immunity could extend only to those individuals who produce evidence under com-
pulsion. However, the continuance in business, the courts have in effect held, amounts
to a waiver of the privilege in respect to books and records which the Act requires
be kept. It follows that the grant of immunity set forth in the Act applies only to
oral testimony33 and the compulsory production of 'books, papers and records not
required to be kept under the Act. Such documentary evidence, in most cases, can
have little evidentiary. value in criminal prosecutions for violations of the Act,
and, therefore, the grant of immunity would appear to be a high price to pay for
such evidence. A seemingly legitimate criticism may be levelled at the draftsman-
ship of this part of the Act: Congress has granted an immunity which, upon exami-
nation of the courts, amounts to very little. The incorporation into the Emergency
Price Control Act of the provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act is confusing
since at first glance the immunity provision would seem to apply to the books.
papers and records required to be kept in the subdivisions of the same section of
the Act immediately preceding. The courts have held otherwise.
A further argument in support of the construction of the Act arrived at by the
courts is based upon a well established rule of statutory interpretation. A statute is
to be construed so as to be effective and workable.3 4 If the books and documents
which record the transactions covered by the Act are not available as evidence
except at the price of complete immunity, enforcement of the Act by criminal
prosecution would be greatly hampered.
29. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended 56 STAT. 767 (1942) ; 58 STAT. 632 (1944), 50
U. S. C. A. App. § 901 (1944).
30. 56 STAT. 176 (1942), 50 U. S. C. A. Apr. § 631 et seq.
31. This point was mentioned in two decisions but does not appear to have been the
basis for the holding. Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 10th,
1944); United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N. D. Iowa 1945).
32. 221 U. S. 361, 380 (1911).
33. In Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (N. D. Cal. 1945) defendant's objection
to answering certain interrogatories on the plea of self-incrimination was sustained. It
would seem the court might have forced the defendant to answer; however, defendant
would thereby have gained complete'immunity.
34. BLACR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1927) § 65.
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DIVORCE-EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFEcT-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE.-The
Williams and Hendrix families were long-time residents of North Carolina. Mr. Wil-
liams and Mrs. Hendrix went to Nevada in 1940, lived for the required six weeks
in the same auto court, engaged the same attorney to commence divorce proceed-
ings by constructive service upon their respective spouses still in North Carolina,
received default decrees, intermarried, returned to North Carolina and were prose-
cuted and convicted of bigamous cohabitation. This conviction was affirmed through
the Supreme Court of North Carolina but on review by the United States Supreme
Court was reversed: It was held that a divorce granted by Nevada, on an unques-
tioned finding that one spouse was domiciled in Nevada and on mere constructive
service upon the defendant, must be respected by North Carolina even though offen-
sive to North Carolina's policy. Retrial followed this reversal and the convictions
were again affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and were reviewed
a second time by the United States Supreme Court. The precise issue, not presented
by the record on the prior review, was whether North Carolina had the power "to
refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to the find-
ings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds that no bona fide domicil was ac-
quired in Nevada." Held, three Justices dissenting, that the judgment of the Supreme
court of North Carolina permitting such "refusal" was proper. Williams v. North
Carolina, - U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092 (1945).1
The actual holding of the Court is succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
writing the majority opinion: "We conclude that North Carolina was not required
to yield her state policy because a Nevada court found that petitioners were domi-
ciled in Nevada when it granted them decrees of divorce. North Carolina was en-
titled to find, as she did, that they did not acquire domicile in Nevada and that the
Nevada court was therefore without power to liberate the petitioners from amena-
bility to the laws of North Carolina governing domestic relations."12 Justice Frank-
furter based this holding on clearly settled judicial precedent.3 The full faith and
credit clause does not make a judgment of one state automatically a judgment of
any other state. 4 A judgment on the merits in one state is, however, regarded as con-
clusive in another state, if the court of the first state had jurisdiction to render the
judgment.5 Decrees of divorce like other judgments are subject to this restriction
and at least one of the parties must be domiciled in the state before a state court
has jurisdiction to grant a divorce.6 Here, North Carolina, having given appro-
priate weight to the finding of domicile in the Nevada decree, found that neither of
the defendants had acquired a domicile in Nevada and that consequently North
Carolina was not required to recognize the Nevada divorce decrees.
Though apparently following well-settled judicial precedents, Justice Frankfurter's
1. The first conviction was affirmed in 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941), but
reversed in 317 U. S. 287 (1942) and sent back for retrial. The second conviction was.
affirmed in 224 N. C. 183, 29 S. E. (2d) 744 (1944), and on appeal was affirmed - U. S.
-, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092 (1945).
2. - U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 1099 (1945).
3. Powell, And Repent At Leisure (1945) 58 HARv. L. Rlv. 930, 971; accord, Corwin,
Out-Haddocking Haddock (1945) U. OF PA. L. REv. 341, 344.
4. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1839).
5. GooDmxcu, CONFICTS Or LAW (2d ed. 1935) § 204.
6. Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901).
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majority opinion was sharply, if not effectively, 7 attacked by justices Rutledge and
Black. Justice Black claimed that the right to reject a judgment of a sister state
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction results from the adoption by the Supreme
Court of a dissenting doctrine in an early case.8 Admitting the verity of this criti-
cism, it is sufficiently answered by pointing out that such dissenting doctrine had
become the settled law in this -country and to overturn it now would involve a
more drastic disregard of stare decisis than could possibly have been involved in
the formulation of the law in the early days. Secondly, Justice Rutledge is troubled
by the Court's failure to impeach the divorce decrees within Nevada and to extend
full faith and credit to what the dissenters claimed to be a valid judgment. But
the Court did not consider such action necessary since North Carolina might prop-
erly find that Nevada had no jurisdiction to render the divorce decrees and that
therefore, at least for the precise purpose of sustaining the conviction, there was no
need to impeach the Nevada decrees. This appears to be the point of departure
between the majority and the dissenters.
This point of departure in further widened by the dissenters' insistence, par-
ticularly Justice Black's, upon stressing Nevada's rights and interests. It would seem
obvious that North Carolina's rights and interests are paramount9 since, after all,
both families were long-time residents of that State and the errant spouses returned
to that State immediately after securing their respective divorces. Once we con-
cede North Carolina's paramount position, much of the force of the dissenters'
attack on the criminal aspects of the case is lost. It was Justice Black's contention
that the North Carolina criminal statute' o which excepted from its provisions
those who were "validly divorced", was so vague in its application that ordinary
men of common intelligence could not determine their proper course under its
mandate and that, therefore, the statute was unconstitutional on such ground."
But this point is of little weight in the light of the defendants' deliberate conduct
in leaving the state to acquire divorces,' 2 which they could not procure within
North Carolina, and which any lawyer could have told them would be of doubt-
ful validity in view of the established law at that time.' 3 Any vagueness which
7. Powell, supra note 3, at 1016.
8. Justice Johnson's dissent in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. 481, 484 (U. S. 1813).
9. "Marriage is more than a personal relation between a man and a woman. It is a
status founded on contract and established by law. It constitutes an institution involv-
ing the highest interests of society. It is regulated and controlled by law based upon
principles of public policy affecting the welfare of the people of the State. . . . There
are, in effect, three parties to every marriage, the man, the woman and the State." Fearon
v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268, 272, 5 N. E. (2d)- 815, 816 (1936).
10. N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1935) § 4342.
11. Citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926).
12. With a possible lack of consistency, Justice Black pleading for the application of
the territorial theory said: "The jurisdiction of state courts over persons and things
within their boundaries has been uniformly acknowledged through the years . . .", - U. S.
-, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 1115 (1945). Justice Black failed to realize its prior and continu-
ing application in favor of North Carolina where the defendants were only briefly out of
North Carolina and then for the express purpose of escaping North Carolina's recognized
jurisdiction. This paramount territorial relation is something more than the "attenuated
state interest", mentioned by Justice Black.
13. Under the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906), a divorce based
.on constructive service of the defendant would have had no validity in North Carolina
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may have. existed in the statute was created by the defendants' own actions in
seeking out-of-state divorces. Had they obtained their divorces in North Caro-
lina, there would have been no difficulty in determining whether they were "validly
divorced."
Justice Rutledge's dissent, however, did point out a very probable source of
future difficulties. He complained of the vagueness of the majority's concept of do-
micile and the failure to establish a more definite standard of proof. But even Jus-
tice Black would be forced to admit that these particular defendants lacked the
necessary intent to establish a domicile in Nevada.' 4 So Justice Frankfurter may
well have been justified, in view of the actual facts of this case, in abstaining from
attempting to establish a minimum standard of domicile.' 5 On the other hand,
his abstention leaves unanswered the difficulties which will undoubtedly arise when
the facts are not so one-sided. Justice Rutledge favors, for the certainty it would
provide, either a recognition of a dearly transient divorce buttressed by appro-
priate due process safeguards, 16 or some minimum period of permanency or stability
of residence17 which will satisfy the jurisdictional requirement wherever ques-
tioned.j 8 Justice Black predicted dire consequences from the Court's decision,
but this is to be doubted. The holding is in accord with precedent and has long
been settled law in other jurisdictions.' 9
New York has for some time refused to enforce a foreign decree of divorce when
it appeared that the defendant was a domiciliary of this state, and was not per-
sonally served in the foreign action and did not appear therein.20 When the ma-
jority opinion in the first appeal to the Supreme Court in the Williams case left
untouched the question of the right of the domiciliary state to determine independ-
ently whether a domicile had been established by the plaintiff in the granting state,
the New York courts showed a dear intent to limit that decision by refusing recog-
nition to sister state default decrees granted on constructive service on the ground
prior to the first Williams case.
14. Any reasonable man would be forced to admit the lack of intent to establish domi-
cile on the part of the defendants, if confronted with the additional evidence before
the North Carolina court which could not have been before the Nevada court-i.e., the
defendants' immediate marriage and return to North Carolina.
15. This evidence of judicial restrbint is, of course, an established canon of constitu-
tional law. See Brandeis, J., concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936).
16. Due process would require that proper notice be given to the other spouse. This
would be sufficient under the doctrine of Williams L But cf. Justice Jackson, dissenting in
317 U. S. 287, 316-320 (1942).
17. Approximately 33 states required a year's residence while 42 require a year or
more. WARREN, ScHoux. n DIvORCE MANUAL (1944) 705-720.
18. Professor Powell is sure that Congress could promulgate the requisite standards for
compulsory recognition under the full faith and credit clause, but is doubtful whether
Congress could compel rejection of non-complying decrees. Powell, And Repent at Leisure
(1945) 58 HARv. L. REv. 930, 1011.
19. 1 BEALE, CoN cTS OF LAw (1935) § 11.2; GOODRICH, CONr-rcs or LAW
(2d ed. 1938) § 123.
20. Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, i73 N. E. 680 (1930); De Meli v. De Meli,
120 N. Y. 485, 24 N. E. 996 (1890); Cross v. Cross, 108 N. Y. 628, 15 N. E. 333
(1888) ; Kaiser v. Kaiser, 192 App. Div. 400, 182 N. Y. Supp. 709 (1st Dep't 1920).
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that the alleged domicile of the plaintiff was merely a sham.21 This interpretation
of the holding in Williams I was fully sanctioned by the second Williams decision.
However, as the Supreme Court did not undertake to establish any guiding rule
for "the minimum standards of domicile in the divorce state sufficient to warrant
application of the full faith and credit clause of the constitution," 22 the second forum
must still decide the issue of domicile according to the general principles of the
law of domicile.2 These principles have been interpreted in New York as allowing
the rejection of "a sister State default decree of divorce against a New York State
domiciliary in any case where it is apparent that the tourist plaintiff cocked one eye
askance at the examining justice while solemnly swearing intention to remain per-
manently in the divorce forum State and with the other eye anxiously watched
the courtroom clock in nervous concern about catching the afternoon train back
home."24 With the sanction of Williams II, the former New York rule that New
York reserves the right to pass upon the bona fides of the domicile of the parties
in a sister state25 is now reinforced.
Prior to Williams 11, a Nevada divorce decree based upon consensual personal
appearance by the defendant was entitled to recognition in New York26 and was
not considered offensive to the public policy of the State. However, in a recent
case 27 the Appellate Division suggested that this was no longer the law in New
York in view of the deemphasis placed on the requirement of jurisdiction over the
person by Williams L Matter of Lindgren28 is cited as authority for the conclusion
that not even consent of a non-resident defendant will necessarily serve to pre-
clude an inquiry into the alleged domicile of the other party in the granting state.
But that case is clearly distinguishable since the personal appearance of the defend-
ant was entered nunc pro tune several years after the divorce decree was granted.
Williams II offers no solution to this problem as the Court apparently did not over-
rule Davis v. Davis"9 which allowed a state court to make a final determination,
binding in all jurisdictions, on the question of domicile where both parties appeared.
This conclusion finds support in a recent denial of review by the Court 0 in a
Nevada divorce action in 'which the defendant appeared.
Less difficulty is found by the dissenters in agreeing with the majority in Wil-
liams 1I when a support order is involved. Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
21. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 179 Misc. 623, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd, 268. App. Div. 1070, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 817 (2d Dep't 1945); Reese v. Reese, 179
Misc. 665, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 468 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N. Y. S. (2d)
685 (2d Dep't 1944).
22. Meyers v. Meyers, 179 Misc. 680, 681, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 444 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
23. Kurski v. Kurski, N. Y. L. J., July 23, 1945, p. 1, col. 4.
24. Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564, 570, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 538, 546 (Dom. Rel
Ct. 1943).
25. Matter of Holmes, 291 N. Y. 261, 52 N. E. (2d) 424 (1943); Matter of Bingham,
265 App. Div. 463, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 756 (2d Dep't 1943); Sodero v. Sodero, - Misc.
-, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 823 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
26. Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N. Y. 296, 12 N. E. (2d) 305 (1938).
27. Solotoff v. Solotoff, 269 App. Div. 677, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 510 (2d Dep't 1945).
28. 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. (2d) 849 (1944).
29. 305 U. S. 32 (1938).
30. Miedema v. Pratt, 14 U. S. L. Week. 3076 (1945).
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vania,31 companion case to Williams 1H, by a unanimous decision allowed a Penn-
sylvania court to reject, as a bar to a support order, a Nevada divorce decree as
without bona fide domicile. There is apparently a basic difference between the prob-
lem of marital capacity and the problem of support.32 Several of the Justices were
not "convinced that in the absence of an appearance or personal service the decree
need be given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or support of
the other spouse or the children."33 It is their contenton that quite different con-
siderations are involved when the domiciliary state seeks to compel the support
of a deserted wife and child and that such an action is not necessarily defeated by
interposing an out of state divorce. A late New York decision34 adopting with
approval the doctrine' expressed in the Esenwein case, pointed out that the deter-
mination of the support order will not be res adjudicata in any matrimonial or
declaratory judgment action brought in the New York Supreme Court.35
Williams I no longer permits the refusal by New York of recognition to ex parte
divorce decrees granted by a sister state against a non-resident defendant upon
constructive service and without appearance provided that a bona fide domicile ac-
cording to New York standards is established in the divorce forum. But Williams II
preserves in New York the right to unilateral judgment regarding the bona fides
of a domicile in the divorce forum.
And finally, New York apparently need no longer consider the question of the
fault of one spouse in leaving the other to establish such domicile as that question
is no longer pertinent in determining a state's power to alter the marital status of
its domiciliaries.3 6
INCOME TAX---GROSS INCOME-PRIZES, INCOME OR GIFT.-The taxpayer won the
Ross Essay Prize, in the sum of $3,000, awarded by the American Bar Association
in its capacity as trustee under the will of a retired federal judge of a fund of
$100,000. By the terms of this trust, the American Bar Association was to offer and
pay a prize for the best essay on a subject chosen by it at its preceding annual
meeting. The trustee had the right in any given year to expend less than the entire
income for that year or to expend more than the entire current income and any
accumulated income, the deficit thus created in the principal being defrayed by the
income of the subsequent year. The taxpayer contended that the prize was a gift,
and the Commissioner asserted that the $3,000 represented taxable income. The
Tax Court held for the Commissioner upon the finding that the taxpayer received
$3,000 of the income of the trust for the year involved as a designated distributee
thereof. Upon appeal it was held, one judge dissenting, that the prize constituted a
non-taxable gift. McDermott v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 150 F. (2d)
585 (App. D. C. 1945).
31. - U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 1118 (1945).
32. Id. at 1119.
33. Id. at 1120.
34. Kurski v. Kurski, N. Y. L. J., July 23, 1945, p. 1, col. 4.
35. Loomis v. Loomis, 288 N. Y. 222, 42 N. E. (2d) 495 (1942).
36. Matter of Bingham, 265 App. Div. 463, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 756 (2d Dep't 1943);
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 179 Misc. 623, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 268
App. Div. 1070, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 817 (2d Dep't 1945); Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc.
564, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 538 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1943).
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All gains from gambling, betting and lotteries, even though earned in transactions
which are illegal, are subject to tax since they fall within the broad definition of
gross income embracing gains, profits and income derived from any source whatever.'
The deduction of wagering losses is permitted only to the extent of the taxpayer's
gains from similar transactions. 2 Consequently where a sweepstakes ticket was given
to a husband and wife, the winnings of more than $100,000 were held to be taxable
to them, the only exempt portion being the cost of the ticket to the donor. The
Board of Tax Appeals reasoned that the cost of the ticket represented an investment
similar in principle to the purchase of shares bf stock or other income-producing
property and that the excess of the winnings over that investment represented a
return thereon. Similarly the Treasury Department as early as 1923 proclaimed its
opinion that the cash or fair market value of property won as prizes in guessing
contests or as the holder of the lucky ticket among those distributed to patrons of
a restaurant represented taxable income.
4
The Tax Court based its holding that the prize involved in the instant case repre-
sented taxable income to the petitioner upon the finding that the taxpayer had
"received $3,000 of the income of the trust in the year involved as a duly designated
distributee thereof."5 The Tax Court apparently relied upon Section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code which provides, in part, for a deduction in computing the
net income of a trust of a sum equal to the amount of its current income which is
distributed currently by the trustee, in the exercise of his discretion, to the bene-
ficiaries, and for the concomitant inclusion of such amount in the taxable incomes
of the beneficiaries.
The Circuit Court in reversing the decision of the Tax Court succinctly held that,
even had the taxpayer received current income of the trust, it would not necessarily
follow that the award was part of his income, because only trust income accruing to
a beneficiary by virtue of the fact that it is income of the trust is taxable to the
beneficiary.6 In other words, the mere fact that the payment to a beneficary is
primarily payable and in fact paid out of trust income is inadequate to identify as
taxable income a sum accruing to a beneficiary regardless of whether the trust
realizes income or not.7 Consequently the taxpayer's liability, if any, depended upon
1. INT. REv. CoD § 22 (a).
2. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (h).
3. Max Silver, 42 B. T. A. 461 (1940).
4. I. T. 1651, 1I-i Cum. BuLL. 54 (1923) ; I. T. 1667, 11-1 Cum. BULL. 83 (1923).
5. Malcolm McDermott, 3 T. C. 929 (1944).
6. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161 (1925); Heiner v. Beatty, 17 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A.
3d, 1927), aff'd, 276 U. S. 598 (1928). In the principal case the Court reasoned that even
if the prize were payable only out of income by an educational or other charitable trust,
like the Bar Association, to a beneficiary not named in the trust instrument, the rule of
the Gavit and Beatty cases (where the beneficiaries were so named) would be inapplicable.
In the latter cases the testator, in effect, gave to the beneficiaries an interest in the trust
funds while in the instant case the trustee was not a mere conduit through which the
trust income flowed to the beneficiary.
7. The most recent decisions applying this rule hold that where the beneficiary is to
receive a minimum payment annually of $12,000 payable out of trust income or corpus
and the entire income for any year if it should exceed that sum, such payments are annui-
ties not taxable to the beneficiary, that they are made in discharge of a gift, and actual
invasion of trust corpus is immaterial. Coleman v. Commissioner, 151 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A.
3d, 1945), rev'g, 3 T. C. 943 (1944).
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whether the award was part of his gross income or whether the award was a gift.S
The Court, in determining that the prize was a gift and not taxable income empha-
sized certain circumstances inducing its finding. The purpose of both the settlor
and the trustee was to give and to incite scholarship and the dominant motive of
the contestant was the recognition and prestige to be gained by the selection of his
essay. Whatever services the taxpayer rendered were not rendered to the trustee
and the taxpayer did not regard himself as exchanging his services or his essay for
money. Nor could one say that the Association paid the taxpayer either for writing
an essay or for the essay itself without resorting to strained and artificial reasoning.
The Commissioner apparently was attempting to vary his past practice in that taxes
had never been assessed on other Ross prizes or any other scholarships and prizes
awarded on a competitive basis such as Nobel prizes, Guggenheim fellowships and
Rhodes scholarships. Their taxation would conflict with the settled policy of en-
couraging scholarly work.
The definitions of the word gift are almost as numerous as the cases involving
the subject of gifts itself. In Helvering v. American Dental Co.,9 which involved
the question whether forgiven rents and interest which had been offset against tax-
able income in prior years, constituted taxable income or a gift to the debtor, in
the year of realization, the Court stated, "Gifts, however, is a generic word of broad
connotation, taking coloration from the context of the particular statute in which
it may appear. Its plain meaning in its present setting denotes, it seems to us,
the receipt of financial advantages gratuitously."'10 The New York Court of Appeals
has defined a gift as "a valid transfer of his property from one to another without
consideration therefor."'" While the Court in the principal case does not indicate
what comparative weight was given to each of the circumstances leading to the
finding that the Ross Prize for 1939 constituted a gift, the conclusion reached would
appear amply justified under the common law definitions of a gift. Carsan v. Watts12
expressed the English rule that prize money gained by an apprentice serving on
board a letter of marque ship did not belong to the master of the apprentice though
the master was entitled to all payments for the apprentice's services. The prize
money was held to constitute a gift and not compensation for service. In the
slightly earlier case of Kirksey v. Kirksey,13 the Supreme Court of Alabma held to
be a gratuity the following proposal made by the defendant to his widowed sister-
in-law: ". . . if you will come down and see me, I will let you have a place to
raise your family, and I have more open land than I can tend; and on account of
your situation, and that of your family, I feel like I want you and the children to
do well." The apparent point of difficulty in this case was the condition stipulated
by the brother-in-law that the widow should suffer herself to move some sixty or
seventy miles before receiving the benefit of his proposal. An examination of the
respective intents of the parties leads inexorably to the conclusion that there was
no mutual intention to enter into a legally binding agreement. The sister-in-law in
8. The Court expressly disclaimed any interpretation of the amendment to § 22 (b) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code made by § 111 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1942 providing
that there shall not be excluded from gross income under that paragraph, which exempts
gifts of property, gifts of income from property.
9. 318 U. S. 322 (1943).
10. Id. at 330.
11. Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 68 (1873).
12. 8 Doug. 350 (K. B. 1874).
13. 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
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moving from her former residence could not have expected or intended that that
act should be considered to have been performed in exchange for a future home
nor does it seem conceivable that the defendant offered a home in exchange therefor.
He intended to give upon fulfillment of a condition, not to contract. 14 In United
States v. Merriamb5 the Supreme Court, considering a bequest made in lieu of
executor's commissions, held the bequest to be gratuitous even though the executor
was entitled to the bequest only upon clothing himself, in good faith, with the
character of such fiduciary by proving the will or unequivocally manifesting an
intention to act. Here again the Court found a gratuity had been bestowed even
though the recipient was required to perform some condition precedent. The same
problem was recently presented in yet another form. Under the provisions of the
Social Security Act,16 nurses and others engaged in public health work are granted
tuition, board and maintenance allowances to further their educations. The Income
Tax Unit has recently issued a decision holding that such allowances represent
"gratuities in aid of the accomplishment of the public benefit involved" and that,
therefore, they are not includible in the gross incomes of the recipients.' 7
These decisions would seem to substantiate the position taken by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in the principal case. The prize obviously was intended to be
bestowed as a gratuity rather than paid as a purchase price. Its purpose was to
effect a public good rather than a personal end. Any contestant receiving the award
must have considered it an honorarium in recognition of scholastic achievement
rather than compensation of any nature.
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-INDIvU.LS COVERED-EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR.--The plaintiff instituted a suit against the United States to recover in-
surance contributions and unemployment taxes paid by the plaintiff under the
provisions of the Social Security Act, as amended, for certain "coal hustlers" whose
principal work appeared to consist of storing coal for plaintiff's customers. The
plaintiff had no express agreement or contract of any type with the hustlers, but
paid them after they had completed each storage of coal. The court below dismissed
the complaint holding that the coal hustlers were employees of the plaintiff within
the meaning of the Social Security Act, as amended. The plaintiff appealed. Held,.
judgment affirmed. Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. (2d) 679 (App. D. C.) 1945, cert.
denied, - U. S. - (1945).
The court put forth two reasons for its decision. First, it held that the common
law rules for determining the employer-employee relationship are not necessarily
to be used in determining whether that r:elationship exists within the meaning of
the Social Security Act, as amended. It declared that coverage under the Act is
14. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1936) § 112. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E.
256 (1891) wherein an uncle had promised his nephew $5,000 upon the condition that
the boy refrain from drinking, smoking and gambling until he became twenty-one years
of age, is distinguishable from the Kirksey case by the finding of the New York Court of
Appeals that the satisfactory performance of the nephew constituted the inducement for
the uncle's promise. That is, the uncle sought the performance by the nephew in exchange
for his promise to pay $5,000 and there was present, therefore, a contractual intent.
15. 263 U. S. 179 (1923).
16. SocL. SEcurITY ACT, 49 STAT. 629 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. § 409 (13) (1943).
17. I. T. 3756, INT. REV. BuLL. 17-12118, at 2 (1945).
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to be judged from the purpose Congress had in mind when enacting such legislation
pursuant to a public policy unknown to the common law. It said that where persons
are subject to the economic evils that the law was intended to cure, they should
be covered by the Act whether or not they are employees in the common law sense.
Secondly, it held that the hustlers were not independent contractors. Although there
were no written contracts of employment, there were implied contracts, and the
men were subject to rigid supervision as a result of the plaintiff's practice of paying
them only when they returned a card signed by a satisfied customer. The plaintiff,
therefore, retained the right to supervise the men in the performance of the task
itself. Since this right to control is the most important factor in determining whether
the employer-employee relationship exists at common law,1 it would seem that the
first reason expressed by the court, as stated above, need not have been relied upon
to arrive at its decision. Basing coverage .under the Act upon the need for pro-
tection, however, is an important indication of a recent trend in some federal courts2
to substitute a vague, undefined rule which relies largely upon the court's subjective
interpretation of public lpolicy for the well recognized rules of the common law
defining the employer-employee status which the Social Security Act appears to
contemplate.
The test for determining whether or not an employer-employee relationship
exists under the common law is well established. Three factors are generally con-
sidered: (1) the power to select, hire, and discharge the employee,3 (2) the pay-
ment of wages,4 (3) the power to control the employee's work.5 The last is the
most important factor,6 and the others are merely indicative of this right.7 If the
individual in question is subject to control only as to the result to be accomplished,
then he is an independent contractor. If, however, he is subject to control as to the
means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished, then he is an em-
ployee.8 The fact that some degree of control is reserved or exercised does not
necessarily change an independent contractor relationship into an employee
relationship.9
The Social Security Act defines "employment" as any service performed within
the United States by an employee for his employer, 0 with certain limited excep-
1. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518 (1889).
2. United States v. Vogue, 145 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944); La Lone v. United
States, 57 F. Supp. 947 (E. D. Wash. 1944); see National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
3. Balt. Boot & Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Jamar, 93 Md. 404, 49 Atl. 847 (1901).
4. Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Steinmeier, 72 Md. 313, 20 AUt. 188 (1890).
The payment of compensation in the form of wages is an incident of the employer-employee
relation merely, and is not one of its essentials. Reed v. Ridout's Ambulance, 212 Ala.
428, 102 So. 906 (1925); Schumann v. Calif. Cotton Credit Corp., 105 Cal. App. 136,
286 Pac. 1068 (1930).
5. Ad. Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Tredway, 120 Va. 735, 93 S. E. 560 (1917), cert. denied,
245 U. S. 670 (1918).
6. REsTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 2, 220; Stevens, Test of the Employment Relation,
(1939) 38 Mir. L. REv. 188.
7. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215 (1909).
8. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 523 (1889).
9. 1 LABATT, MAsTE AND SERVANT (2d ed. 1913) § 225; Radio City Music Hall v.
United States, 135 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
10. Socy. SECURiTY ACT, 49 STAT. 639 (1935), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1426 (1940).
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tions.11 Under the Act the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was authorized to
make and publish rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Act.12 Treasury
Regulations 90 and 91 were thus promulgated. Under these regulations the legal
relationship of employer and employee is the test of employment. 13 The regulations
go on to explain that this relationship generally exists where the employer has the
right to control the details of the employee's work whether or not he exercises this
right; that the right to discharge, the furnishing of tools, and of a place to work
are indications that the employer-employee relationship exists; that as a general
rule, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors, subcontractors, public
stenographers, auctioneers, and others who follow an independent trade, business,
or profession, in which they offer their services to the public are independent con-
tractors and not employees; that where there is doubt, the facts of each case must
be examined to see if the employer-employee relationship exists; and that if it does
exist, it is of no consequence that the employee was designated under another name.
nor is the manner in which he is compensated material.14
In statutory interpretation the basic rule is that the legislature is presumed to
use words in their ordinary sense unless the context of the statute contradicts
that sense.15 It must be presumed that Congress was aware of this established
principle at the time of the enactment of the Social Security Act, and if different
guides than those of the common law were to be used in determining whether the
relationship of employer and employee existed between parties in the application
of the statute, they should have been embodied in the Act.16 The courts must give
great weight to the defining regulations, provided they are not contrary to the basic
statutory law,17 to determine whether or not the employer-employee relationship
exists.' 8 Congress has convened several times since these regulations were promul-
gated and it has not expressed any disapproval of them whatsoever.19 Such acqui-
11. The Social Security Act excepts from its provisions agricultural labor, domestic
servants, employees of the United States and of the various states, and a limited number
of others.
12. SOCLx SECURITY ACT, 49 STAT. 638 (1935), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1429 (1940).
13. Treasury Regulations 91 Promulgated Under Title VIII of the Social Security Act,
Art. 2 & 3; Treasury Regulations 90, Art. 205, (Italics added).
14. Ibid. See note 4 supra.
15. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (1904); Old Colony Ry. Co. v. Comm.,
284 U. S. 552 (1932).
16. Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
17. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 342 (1920).
18. Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933).
19. In this connection, reference should be made to the decision by Judge Schwellenbach,
now Secretary of Labor, in La Lone v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 947 (E. D. Wash. 1944)
where the court refers to the report of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of
Representatives of June 6, 1939, regarding an amendment to the Social Security Act. This
Committee said, ". . . A restricted view of the employer-employee relationship should
not be taken in the administration of the Federal old-age and survivor's insurance system
in making coverage determinations. The tests for determining the relationship laid down
in cases relating to tort liability . . . should not be narrowly applied." 84 CoNG. Rzec. 6711,
et seq. (1939). It must be noted the committee did not say that the common law test
for the employer-employee relationship ought not to apply. It merely said it should not
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escence may be construed as approval.20
The decisions as to coverage under the Social Security Act must, of necessity,
vary upon the facts of each case,2' but until the recent decision in United States v.
Vogue22 the courts have been consistent in applying exclusively, the common law
test in arriving at their conclusions. They have accepted Article 3 of Regulations
91 as an authoritative definition of the distinction between an "employee" and an
"independent contractor," and have recognized that it is an exact statement of the
common law.2 3 In determining whether the employer-employee relationship exists,
be narrowly applied. The Treasury Regulations and decisions based upon the common law
rules have not been out of harmony, therefore, with the views expressed by this committee.
20. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933); McCaugn
v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (1931). But see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S.
106 (1940); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U. S. 371 (1943).
21. For example, in Radio City Music Hall v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943), entertainers subject to suggestions for timing their act, approval of changes
in personnel of the act, and employer's standards of dignity and good taste, were held not
subject to the control necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; in Jones
v. Goodson, 121 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941), taxicab drivers, some using their own
cabs and some renting company cabs, but all subject to definite company rules as to their
operation of the cab, were held to be under sufficient control or subject to a sufficient
right to control to make the taxi company an employer under the Social Security Act;
in Williams v. United States, 126 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
750 (1943), 36 ILL. L. Rav. 586, musicians working under a union contract which provided
that they accept employment only from the leader were held to be employees of the
leader and not of the establishment that hired the band; in Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F-
(2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), a wholesale gas and oil distributor, who was paid on a
commission basis and generally conducted his business in his own way except that the
Texas Company retained the power to set his retail prices, was held not subject to sufficient
control to make him an employee of the Texas Company.
22. 145 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944). The question in the case was whether
seamstresses working in the alteration department of Vogue, Inc., were employees under
the Social Security Act. The seamstresses were paid on a percentage basis, observed the
same hours as others in the store, were furnished a place to work, and were subject to
call by the store owner. They furnished their own working materials and made the
alterations in accordance with their own judgment. The court held that the seamstresses
were employees under the Act. The court suggested that coverage under the Social Security
Act was not necessarily to be tested by the common law rules. The court held that,
although control over every detail of the seamstresses work was not present, the right
to control was and that, therefore, the seamstresses clearly were employees as defined
under Treasury Regulations 90. Here, as in the principal case, it would seem that there
was no need for the court to go beyond the common law test for the employer-employee
relationship in arriving at its conclusion that the individuals involved were employees.
23. Raaio City Music Hall v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 715, 717 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
Speaking about the definition under Article 3 of Regulations 91, judge Learned Hand said,
"It is really no more than a gloss upon the definition contained in justice Gray's opinion
in Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn." justice Gray's opinion in the cited case was that ". . . the
relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct
the manner in which the business shall be done as well as the result to be accomplished,
or, in other words, 'not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done'." Singer Mfg-
Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 523 (1889).
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therefore, these courts have considered decisive the amount of control to which
the individual in question is subject.24
Recently, for the first time in this type of cases arising under the Social Security
Act, the court in United States v. Vogue, 25 and the court in the principal case, have
indicated that the common law definition is not necessarily the proper test. These
two cases stress the recent decision by the Supreme Court in National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc.2 6 There, in holding that newsboys were
employees within the National Labor Relations Act,2 7 the Court said that common
law conceptions of employer-employee relationships applicable in cases of tort
liability did not govern coverage under the Wagner Act and that although Congress
did not specifically define "employee" or "employer" in that Act,28 it ". . . had
in mind a wider field than the narrow tech~hical legal relation of 'master and servant,'
as the common law had worked this out. .... -29 The Court held that coverage
under the Wagner Act was to be construed broadly and determined by underlying
economic facts rather than on technical legal classifications. The test indicated in
this decision would appear to be whether the relationship requires protection.30 It
would be well to note, however, that in his dissenting opinion in the Hearst case
Justice Roberts said that when Congress legislated that the term "employee" shall
include any employee, it was saying as clearly as possible that it referred to the
employer-employee relationship as it existed in the common traditional sense in
which the people have come to know it.31
The court in the instant case also relies upon various decisions32 under the Fair
Labor Standards Act,3 3 which like the National Labor Relations Act, is considered
by the court in the principal case to be comparable to the Social Security Act
because it is based upon the same broad policy of public benefit. Here again the
term "employee" is legislatively undefined, but under Section 203(g) of the Fair
24. McGowan v. Lazeroff, 148 F. (2d) 512 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945); Radio City Music
Hall v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); American Oil Co. v. Fly,
135 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943); Williams v. United States, 126 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A.
7th, 1942), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 750 (1943), 36 ILL. L. REv. 586; Jones v. Goodson, 121
F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); Anglim v. Empire Star Mines Co., 129 F. (2d) 914
(C. C. A. 9th, 1942); Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Indian
Refining Co. v. Dallman, 31 F. Supp. 455 (S. D. Ill. 1940), aff'd, 119 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A.
7th, 1941); Cannon Valley Milling Co. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 785 (D. C., D. Minn.
1945); Burruss v. Early, 44 F. Supp. 21 (W. D. Va. 1942).
25. 145 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944).
26. 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
27. 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (1942).
28. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs AcT, 49 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3)
(1942). "The term 'employee' shall include any employee. . ."; Cf. definition of an em-
ployee under Social Security Act and Treasury Regulations 90 and 91 promulgated under
the Act.
29. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 124
(1944).
30. Id. at 129.
31. Id. at 135.
32. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386, 62 (1942); Southern Ry. Co.
v. Black, 127 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942); Walling v. American Needlecrafts, 139
F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943).
33. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq. (1942).
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Labor Standards Act the verb "employ" is defined as "to suffer or permit to work."
This definition is clearly far broader than the definition of "employ" adopted by
the Treasury Regulations under the Social Security Act. In discussing the Fair Labor
Standards Act, Senator Black said on the floor of the Senate that the term "employee"
had to be given, ". . . the broadest definition that has ever been included in any
one act."34 This Act was passed two years after the Social Security Act.35
If the test of coverage under the Social Security Act, as suggested by the court
in the instant case, should be not "who is an 'employee'" but "who should be
covered by the Act," the outcome in all the cases that have relied upon the common
law is uncertain.3 6 For instance, in Williams v. United States37 a union agreement
specifying who might employ the members was relied upon as deciding the employee's
coverage. 38 The broader test of coverage suggested in the principal case might
render such an agreement irrelevant. Entertainers and specialty artists, who were
held to be independent contractors in Radio City Music Hall v. United States,39
might easily have been held to need the protection of the Act.
It is important in considering the decisions dealing with this phase of the Social
Security Act, none of which have as yet been reviewed by the Supreme Court of
United States,40 to note that, while the broad test of coverage based upon the need
for protection suggested in the Vogue and in the instant case are clearly not neces-
sary to those decisions, they are indicative of a trend towards the application, by
the courts, of a more liberalized doctrine of coverage under the Act than that
34. 81 CONG. REc. 7657 (1937). It should be pointed out that the word "employee"
has been more narrowly interpreted when used in other federal statutes which have been
enacted for the protection of particular workers. Under the FEDRRAL E LoYanS LW Irrry
AcT, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 (1943), liability is to "employees" of a
particular employer and no others. Concerning this Act the Supreme Court has stated
that ". . .Congress used the words 'employee' and 'employed' in the statute in their
natural sense, and intended to describe the conventional relation of employer and employee".
Robinson v. B. & 0. Ry., 237 U. S. 84 (1915); accord, Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry.
Co., 252 U. S. 475 (1920). Similar results were reached concerning the JoN.s AcT, 41 STAT.
1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. X. § 688 (1944), in Loe v. Goldstein, 101 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A.
9th, 1939), and the FEDERAL SAPTY APPLIANCE AcT, 36 STAT. 298 (1910), 45 U. S. C. A.
§ 11 (1943), where again "employee" is undefined, in Stevenson v. Lake Terminal Ry.
Co., 42 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
35. FAIR LABOR STANDARD AcT, 1938; Soci. SEcuRiTY ACT, 1936.
36. In the event a new test is evolved by the courts these decisions might not be
controlling since they are generally based upon a statement of facts pertaining to a certain
tax period. A new case could be brought upon the same facts but based upon another tax
period, and the court would not be bound by these decisions for they would be bound
by res adjudicata only with respect to the specific period in question.
37. 126 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 750 (1943), 36 ILL.
L. REv. 586.
38. See note 21 supra.
39. 135 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
40. The fact that certiorari has been denied by the Supreme Court in the Williams case
and in the principal case does not mean that the Court agrees with the reasoning nor
necessarily with the result of the cases. A denial of the writ imports no expression of
opinion upon the merits of the case. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,
240 U. S. 251 (1916).
